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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT TO 
APPEAL 
PETER D. MARSHALL* 
INTRODUCTION 
Trials are commonly treated as the embodiment of the criminal justice 
system. Public interest, reflected in—or driven by—media coverage, 
reaches its zenith at trial; verdicts command headlines. A casual observer 
could be forgiven for thinking that criminal proceedings invariably end 
with the entry of verdict and imposition of punishment. But where a 
defendant is convicted, the trial is often not the final stage in the criminal 
process. A convicted person generally has the right to appeal against, or 
seek review of,1 conviction and sentence.2 And there is no reason to think 
that a person who has elected to defend charges will not exercise this right.3 
Criminal appeals are thus a crucially important feature of the modern 
criminal process. Convictions cannot be treated as final until appeal rights 
have been either exhausted or waived. 
Rights of appeal are increasingly ubiquitous. The ability to appeal 
against conviction and sentence is, in most jurisdictions, a matter of right, 
either statutory or constitutional. But this has not always been the case. The 
right to appeal is a comparatively recent addition to the common law 
criminal process. For centuries, these legal systems, in stark contrast to 
those of continental Europe, did not provide a means by which defendants 
could effectively challenge their convictions. 
Despite being both important and prevalent, however, very little 
scholarly attention has been given to the subject of criminal appeals.4 Texts 
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 1.  In this article, appeal and review are used as general, synonymous terms. 
 2.  I recognize, of course, the possibility of post-conviction collateral attack that exists in certain 
jurisdictions. While such proceedings are connected to the criminal process, their very designation as 
collateral attacks indicates that they are not themselves part of the ordinary criminal process. 
 3.  The criminal process has been characterized as a struggle, with most people charged with 
crimes doing everything in their power to avoid punishment. Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the 
Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1964). 
 4.  Andrew Ashworth, General Editor’s Introduction to ROSEMARY PATTENDEN, ENGLISH 
CRIMINAL APPEALS: 1844-1994, at v (1996). 
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on domestic criminal procedure often deal with appeals almost as an 
afterthought. Comparative studies are virtually non-existent. 
This article applies a comparative lens to the modern right to appeal 
against conviction and sentence.5 It argues first that, despite very different 
historical foundations and institutional structures, there has been 
considerable convergence in how criminal appeals are conceptualized in 
common law and European civil law jurisdictions. A number of 
explanations for this convergence are apparent, including the emergence of 
modern human rights law, changes in trial processes, and technological 
advances. Second, the article’s focus turns to the substance of the right, 
particularly the scope of review. It goes on to argue that, although certain 
differences remain, the jurisdictions covered reveal the development of a 
shared understanding of the substance of the right. In particular, this article 
submits that the right to appeal is best understood as requiring a state to 
provide criminal defendants with the opportunity to access a fair process 
that permits adequate and effective review of one’s conviction. 
After setting out the functions of criminal appeals in Part I, Part II 
considers the origins of the right to appeal at common law and in 
continental Europe. Part III then explains the contrasting institutional 
frameworks within which appeals exist. In Part IV, the ways in which 
different jurisdictions, both national and multilateral, conceive of the right 
are surveyed. Potential reasons for the convergence in how the right to 
appeal is conceptualized are then discussed in Part V. Finally, Part VI 
addresses the extent of this convergence, and examines the substance of the 
modern right to appeal. 
I. THE FUNCTIONS OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 
At the broadest level of generality, appeals are concerned with 
correcting error. Mechanisms for error correction are an important feature 
of developed legal systems: “Developed legal systems make provision for 
correcting error. Error—in the sense of good faith differences of opinion 
about finding the facts or about formulating or applying rules of law—is 
expected as a regular occurrence.”6 Error correction, as an overarching 
value, in turn serves a number of distinct functions. 
 
 5.  For convenience, this article will speak of the right to appeal against conviction as 
encompassing the ability also to challenge the sentence imposed. It is beyond the scope of this article to 
consider prosecutorial rights of appeal, which raise distinct issues. 
 6.  JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENÉE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON 
LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 416 (2009). 
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The primary function of the modern right of appeal is to protect 
against miscarriages of justice. As will be seen, the driving force behind the 
establishment of this right in England was concern over the incidence of 
wrongful convictions. Miscarriages arise in at least two ways. First, an 
innocent defendant may be wrongly convicted. There are many possible 
reasons for such errors. The fact-finder may fail to assess the evidence 
properly; may be misled by irrelevant, prejudicial or fabricated evidence; or 
exculpatory evidence may not be produced at trial. Second, a defendant 
may not have received a fair trial for a myriad of potential reasons. Appeals 
provide a forum in which defendants may have these concerns addressed. 
The prevention of miscarriages of justice is an individualized concern: 
appeals are crucial for ensuring that justice is done in each case. This 
function of appeals explains their inclusion in modern human rights 
instruments. Trechsel has argued that it is the only justification that is of 
any relevance to the individual.7 Concerns over equality of treatment may, 
however, also be relevant: a criminal defendant has an expectation that he 
or she will be treated, both procedurally and substantively, in the same 
manner as any other defendant. Appellate courts have an important role to 
play in ensuring that equality of treatment. 
A second function of criminal appeals is to maintain consistency in 
trial courts.8 Appellate courts achieve this through two, linked mechanisms. 
Most obviously, the courts correct anomalous applications of the law in 
particular cases. Clarification and guidance are given, leading to greater 
consistency in the future application of the law.9 In addition, the very 
existence of the right renders appellate oversight likely, which in turn 
encourages consistency (and better decision-making) among trial judges, 
who know that their decisions may be subject to challenge.10 
Third, appeals serve important institutional functions. They provide 
legitimacy to the criminal justice system as a whole. Public confidence in 
the administration of justice increases when miscarriages do not occur and 
when courts dispense criminal justice consistently and fairly.11 More 
 
 7.  STEFAN TRECHSEL, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 362 (2005) (“[I]nternational 
human-rights law is not concerned with the uniform and correct application of national law . . . .”). 
 8.  Lester B. Orfield, The Right of Appeal in Criminal Cases, 34 MICH. L. REV. 937, 938 (1936). 
 9.  A good example is sentencing guideline judgments, in which an appellate court sets out 
appropriate sentencing “bands” and the proper factors to be considered in placing an individual case 
within a band. E.g., R. v A.M. (CA27/2009) [2010] NZCA 114 at para [6-16] William Young P & Ellen 
France J for the Court (N.Z.). 
 10.  Patrick David Hansen, Stacking Appellate Dissents: Due Process in the Appellate Arena, 18 
VAL. U. L. REV. 141, 144 (1983); Nathan A. Smyth, The Limitation of the Right of Appeal in Criminal 
Cases, 17 HARV. L. REV. 317, 317 (1903). 
 11.  Hansen, supra note 10, at 144. 
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basically, appeals are the primary way in which judges, as public officials 
subject to oversight, are held accountable for their performance.12 
Finally, appeals allow questions of law to be settled.13 They provide a 
forum for ensuring the proper interpretation, development and application 
of the criminal law. Appeals have been the context in which the content of 
defendants’ rights, the proper application of rules of evidence, and the 
scope of substantive offenses and defenses have all been developed. 
II. THE HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO APPEAL 
Today, criminal appeals are a feature of both common law and civil 
law jurisdictions. However, this contemporary situation belies the very 
different streams of development that flowed in each system. In order to 
appreciate the extent to which modern appellate review in these systems 
has converged and the reasons for this phenomenon, it is necessary to trace 
the differing historical foundations of the right to appeal in the common 
law world and in the civil law systems of continental Europe. 
A. The Origins of the Right to Appeal in Common Law Jurisdictions 
The criminal appeal, in the common law world, is of recent origin. In 
England, the United States, and Canada, the proposition that those 
convicted of crimes should have the right to challenge their convictions 
only took root around the turn of the twentieth century. In order to 
understand the place the criminal appeal now occupies in common law 
jurisdictions, this section focuses predominantly on its development in 
England, although some mention is made of the United States and Canada. 
While criminal appeals were unknown to the common law for 
centuries, various archaic forms of review were available to defendants.14 
Some appreciation of these methods of control—and their flaws—provides 
crucial context for the eventual creation of a right to appeal. 
The earliest methods of review directly targeted the jury itself. Indeed, 
Langbein has argued that a desire to control juries drove much of the 
common law’s development.15 During the medieval period, jury verdicts 
 
 12.  For further discussion, see Part III. 
 13.  Orfield, supra note 8, at 938-39; Hansen, supra note 10, at 146-49. 
 14.  Although certain differences existed between the English and American practices, these are 
not of sufficient importance to justify separate treatment. See, e.g., Benjamin L. Berger, Criminal 
Appeals as Jury Control: Anglo-Canadian Historical Perspectives on the Rise of Criminal Appeals, 10 
CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 34 (2005) (observing that the new trial procedure was used far more extensively 
during the nineteenth century in the United States than in England). 
 15.  LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 6, at ch. 7. 
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could be quashed through a process known as attaint.16 A second jury, with 
twice as many members, was empanelled to review the verdict.17 If 
reversed, members of the original jury received “savage penalties.”18 This 
process was, however, not available to criminal defendants and was very 
rarely used in criminal cases.19 
During the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the practice of fining 
jurors became common. The Star Chamber, which was responsible for 
protecting against abuse of the legal system,20 regularly fined jurors for 
bringing in acquittals against the weight of the evidence.21 The presumption 
seems to have been that such findings could only be the result of bribery or 
corruption.22 In Bushell’s Case, following the abolition of the Star 
Chamber, the courts ended this practice.23 
In the seventeenth century, the discretion to order a new trial—already 
well established for civil cases24—became available in certain criminal 
cases. The process for deciding whether to order a new trial permitted 
review on broad grounds, which included misdirection and that the verdict 
was against the evidence.25 However, a new trial could only be sought in a 
very narrow range of cases.26 Felonies were entirely excluded. And for 
misdemeanors, the process was restricted to the small number of cases 
heard nisi prius.27 
 
 16.  Id. at 418. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  They were accounted forever infamous; they forfeited all their chattels; their lands and 
tenements were seized; their wives and children were thrown out; their houses were razed; their trees 
were uprooted; their meadows were ploughed; and they were imprisoned. LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 
6, at 417 (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 402-404 
(Oxford 1756-1757)). Jury members “lost their chattels, were jailed for at least a year, and were 
accounted infamous.” Lester B. Orfield, History of Criminal Appeal in England, 1 MO. L. REV. 326, 
327 (1936). 
 19.  LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 418. Attaints were abolished in 1825. Orfield, supra note 
18, at 328. 
 20.  LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 420. 
 21.  Orfield, supra note 18, at 328. 
 22.  LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 421 (quoting from THOMAS A. GREEN, VERDICT 
ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE 140-43 (1985)). 
 23.  Bushell’s Case, (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (CP). 
 24.  Berger, supra note 14, at 7-8. 
 25.  Id. at 8. 
 26.  Orfield, supra note 18, at 328-29. See also Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking the Constitutional 
Right to a Criminal Appeal, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 503, 532-33 (1991) (arguing that, in the United States, 
the motion for a new trial was closely analogous to the modern appeal). 
 27.  In civil cases, pleaded questions of fact could only be answered by local juries. But by the 
fourteenth century, all three common law courts, together with the Chancery department, sat in 
Westminster. The court in which the case was pleaded would therefore issue a writ to the local sheriff, 
ordering him to summon a jury and have them empanelled in Westminster. In practice, however, the 
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The writ of error was a further, but “disappointingly impotent,”28 
method of review. It was the only means by which the record in a criminal 
case could be considered by a higher court after judgment.29 The writ of 
error, a close relation of certiorari, issued from a superior court for the 
purpose of “reviewing and correcting the record of proceedings in an 
inferior court.”30 The greatest limitation was that review was restricted to 
errors appearing on the face of the trial record, a sparse collection of 
formalistic documents: the judge’s commission, the indictment, the 
defendant’s plea, the verdict and any entries made in the minute book.31 
Review was thus effectively restricted to procedural errors and errors in the 
indictment.32 It was not possible to challenge evidentiary rulings, jury 
instructions, or the factual basis for conviction.33 This is not to say that 
verdicts were inevitably upheld: in the United States, for example, courts 
sometimes adopted a very strict approach, overturning convictions for 
minor, technical errors on the record.34 Nevertheless, as Stephen lamented, 
“the grossest errors of fact or of law [could] occur without being in any 
way brought upon the record” and were thus not capable of being 
challenged.35 
The writ of error became all but obsolete in 1848,36 with the 
establishment of the Court for Crown Cases Reserved.37 This Court 
formalized an ancient custom that had developed whereby the judges of the 
superior courts met informally at the Serjeant’s Inn to consider questions of 
 
trial would be conducted locally in front of a circuit judge, who would then report the verdict back to 
the central court to enter judgment. LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 122-23. A motion for a new trial 
was therefore only possible because “judgment was not formally given by the trial judge.” Berger, 
supra note 24, at 8-9 (internal quotation omitted). 
 28.  Berger, supra note 24, at 6. 
 29.  Orfield, supra note 18, at 332. 
 30.  LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 418-19. 
 31.  Orfield, supra note 18, at 332 (noting that the minute book was a private notebook that did 
not have to be kept). 
 32.  Berger, supra note 24, at 6-7. 
 33.  Orfield, supra note 18, at 333. 
 34.  Arkin, supra note 26, at 528 (“[I]n one notorious North Carolina case from the early 1800s, 
the appeals court overturned the defendant’s conviction because the indictment did not ‘set forth the 
length and the depth of the mortal wounds.’”) (quoting State v. Owen, 5 N.C. 307, 308, 1 Mur. 452, 453 
(1810)). 
 35.  Berger, supra note 14, at 6 (quoting JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
OF ENGLAND 309 (London, Macmillan 1883)). 
 36.  Because the Court had the ability to hear cases that could be the subject of the writ, it was 
thereafter rarely used. PATTENDEN, supra note 4, at 9 and n.34 (citing M. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE 
JEOPARDY 242 (1969)). 
 37.  Id. at 8-9. 
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law reserved by trial judges.38 Because those judges were not sitting as a 
court, their decision was treated as that of the trial judge, and reasons were 
not required.39 In contrast, the Court of Crown Cases Reserved sat in public 
and issued reasoned decisions. Recourse, however, remained at the 
discretion of the trial judge, who had to decide to state a case for the 
Court’s opinion,40 and review remained restricted to questions of law and 
could not encompass the reasonableness of the verdict.41 Because of these 
limitations, the Court was sparingly used,42 averaging only eight cases per 
year.43 
During the second half of the nineteenth century, pressure began to 
build for a right to appeal in criminal cases. Between 1844 and 1906, thirty-
one bills concerning appeals were introduced to Parliament, but only one, 
limited to appeals on questions of law, was enacted.44 Calls for change 
came from a number of quarters. Jeremy Bentham, the influential English 
reformer, advocated extending the right to appeal to criminal cases as part 
of his mission to rationalize the common law.45 Members of the profession 
supported this proposal, but for different reasons. Their primary concern 
was that wrongful convictions were not rare occurrences. Bentham’s 
rationale also appeared, with reformers frequently pointing out the 
absurdity of appeals being permitted in civil cases, where only money was 
at stake, but not in criminal cases, where life and liberty were in jeopardy.46 
There was also significant opposition to a right of appeal. English 
judges were the most influential opponents.47 The central pillar of their 
opposition was the assertion that wrongful convictions were extremely 
rare.48 This empirical claim underpinned further arguments about the costs 
 
 38.  Orfield, supra note 18, at 335. 
 39.  Id.  
 40.  Indeed, because references were made by the trial judge himself, those most in need of 
correction were often the most reluctant to expose themselves to reversal. PATTENDEN, supra note 4, at 
9. 
 41.  See id.; Orfield, supra note 18, at 336. In 1802, Congress established a similar procedure— 
“the certificate of division”—whereby the circuit court could certify questions to the Supreme Court, 
but only when they were unable to agree on a point of law. The practice fell into disuse because two-
judge circuit courts became increasingly rare and the Supreme Court was strictly limited to considering 
the question of law that had been certified. Arkin, supra note 26, at 531. 
 42.  Berger, supra note 14, at 12. 
 43.  Orfield, supra note 18, at 336. 
 44.  PATTENDEN, supra note 4, at 6. 
 45.  Berger, supra note 24, at 13. 
 46.  Id. at 17-18. 
 47.  PATTENDEN, supra note 4, at 22-25. 
 48.  Berger, supra note 24, at 24 (quoting Baron Park, who submitted that “the Cases in which the 
Innocent are improperly convicted [were] extremely rare”). 
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and benefits of criminal appeals. A number of these arguments are 
discussed in more detail in Part II.B. 
Around the turn of the twentieth century, the central pillar of the 
judicial opposition to a right of appeal was fractured by two notorious 
miscarriages of justice: the wrongful convictions of Adolf Beck and 
George Edalji.49 In 1891, Beck was convicted of, and served seven years’ 
penal servitude for, frauds committed by another man, Thomas Smith. At 
trial, the prosecution relied on the assertion that, fourteen years earlier, 
Beck had committed similar frauds. The trial judge prevented the defense 
from challenging this plank of the prosecution case, despite the reality that 
it was Smith who had been convicted of those crimes. The judge also 
refused to reserve this question of law for the Court for Crown Cases 
Reserved. While in prison, Beck unsuccessfully petitioned the Home Office 
sixteen times to reexamine the convictions, even presenting potentially 
exculpatory fresh evidence. Three years after being released, Beck was 
again wrongly convicted of Smith’s frauds. His misfortune eventually 
ended when, prior to sentencing, Smith was arrested attempting to pawn a 
stolen ring and confessed to all of the crimes. Beck finally obtained 
pardons and compensation from the Government.50 
A few years later, a second miscarriage of justice came to public 
prominence. In 1903, George Edalji, long a target of racial prejudice, was 
convicted, on the basis of anonymous letters, of disemboweling a horse. 
Despite substantial evidence suggesting his innocence, he served three 
years in prison. Pleas to the Home Office were unsuccessful, including a 
petition signed by 10,000 people. Public pressure, however, continued to 
swell. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle took up the case, publishing two long 
articles arguing for Edalji’s innocence. Finally, in 1907, after a special 
inquiry and further pressure, Edalji was pardoned.51 
The Beck and Edalji debacles, together with other controversial 
convictions, finally produced the necessary political support for a right of 
criminal appeal.52 By this point in history, Pattenden observes, “[r]etrial by 
newspaper had become so prevalent that public confidence in the courts 
was being undermined.”53 An appeal on questions of fact was seen as 
urgently required. Petitions to the Home Office and ad hoc committees of 
inquiry had proved ineffective.54 
 
 49.  For full discussion of the Beck and Edalji cases, see PATTENDEN, supra note 4, at 28-30. 
 50.  Id.  
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. at 30-31. 
 53.  Id. at 31. 
 54.  Id. 
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In 1907, the Criminal Appeal Act was passed.55 The Act established 
the Court of Criminal Appeal, which absorbed the jurisdiction of the Court 
for Crown Cases Reserved, and it abolished both writs of error and the 
High Court’s power to grant new trials.56 Unlike previous review 
mechanisms, appeals under the Act were broad in both scope and 
jurisdiction: appeals were available to all persons convicted on indictment, 
information or inquisition; review of one’s conviction was permitted as of 
right on questions of law and with leave on questions of fact and mixed 
questions of law and fact; review was permitted, with leave, of the 
propriety of the sentence imposed; and, finally, trial judges retained the 
power to state cases for the opinion of the Court.57 
Although a system of appellate review in Canada was enacted prior to 
that in England, it was heavily influenced by the debates on the issue that 
were taking place in the second half of the nineteenth century. The 
Criminal Code of 1892, which established “a system for broad means of 
appeal on questions of both law and fact,” drew heavily from proposals 
submitted to the English Parliament by the Criminal Code Bill Commission 
in 1879.58 
In the United States, as in England, a civil right of appeal existed long 
before a parallel criminal right. Indeed, the explicit grant of civil appellate 
jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1789 was held to exclude review of 
criminal cases by implication.59 It was not until 1879 that Congress 
permitted circuit courts to issue, on a discretionary basis, writs of error in 
criminal cases.60 Then, in 1889 and 1891, Congress granted defendants 
convicted in a range of cases a right of direct appeal to the United States 
Supreme Court.61 Resourcing concerns resulted in the transfer of this 
jurisdiction to the circuit courts, which, by 1911, possessed intermediate 
appellate jurisdiction for all federal criminal cases.62 
 
 55.  Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, § 20(1) (Eng.). 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  CHARLES L. ATTENBOROUGH, PRINCIPLES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 485-86, 493 (12th ed. 
1912). 
 58.  See Berger, supra note 24, at 31-32. 
 59.  United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch.) 159, 173-74 (1805). 
 60.  Francis A. Allen, Griffin v. Illinois: Antecedents and Aftermath, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 151, 154 
(1957). Allen does point out, however, that developments began somewhat earlier in the states. Id. See 
also Arkin, supra note 26, at 527-28. 
 61.  Arkin, supra note 26, at 523. 
 62.  Id. at 523-24. 
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B. Opposition to a Right to Appeal in Common Law Jurisdictions 
The development of a right to appeal in England was strongly 
contested. While the debate centered on the prevalence of wrongful 
convictions, many other reasons were deployed in response to calls for 
reform.63 While these arguments did not ultimately hold sway, some of the 
concerns expressed remain relevant today. 
A common argument was that appeals undermined finality in the 
criminal process. A final determination, it was asserted, must be made 
somewhere. The jury was regarded as the appropriate body to make such a 
determination:64 juries hear the evidence and witnesses first-hand, and are 
therefore best positioned to arrive at the truth. Appellate courts, in contrast, 
are composed of “judges schooled more in abstract law than in human 
nature, studying not the living witnesses but printed records.”65 Traces of 
this objection lingered. Long after rights to appeal were firmly established 
in the United States, Chief Justice Burger bemoaned the harm done to the 
principle of finality by such appeals: “Few things have so plagued the 
administration of criminal justice, or contributed more to lowered public 
confidence in the courts, than the interminable appeals, the retrials, and the 
lack of finality.”66 
Sometimes linked with the finality argument was the misguided 
suggestion that jury trials were, in a sense, analogous to an appeal: a trial, 
so the reasoning went, only occurred after there had first been a preliminary 
hearing or grand jury indictment.67 Neither of those procedures could, of 
course, be fairly characterized as even approaching the protections afforded 
by a trial. 
Criminal appeals as of right were seen as producing a number of 
further costs. Most obviously, a system of appeals as of right is expensive 
to resource.68 Additional appellate judges need to be appointed and support 
staff employed. Expensive changes are also necessary at the trial court 
level, particularly those associated with producing transcripts. 
Delay was seen as a further significant cost. In the nineteenth century, 
when the criminal justice system operated at a break-neck speed, delay was 
 
 63.  Some of the arguments were patently absurd. PATTENDEN, supra note 4, at 22. Lord Denman, 
for example, attributed the support for a right of appeal to lawyers eager for another forum to show their 
skills and to criminals who desired to plead guilty to crimes that they did not commit in order to thumb 
their noses at the authorities. Id.; N. W. SIBLEY, CRIMINAL APPEAL AND EVIDENCE 19 n.2 (1908). 
 64.  Smyth, supra note 10, at 317-18. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 405-06 (1985) (Burger, C.J. dissenting). 
 67.  PATTENDEN, supra note 4, at 16; Orfield, supra note 8, at 944. 
 68.  SIBLEY, supra note 63, at 23. 
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regarded as a “great evil.”69 Any delay in the imposition of punishment 
risked lessening the deterrent effect of the criminal law, especially where 
appellants were released on bail.70 Systemic delay also undermined 
confidence in the reliability of verdicts.71 And, if bail pending appeal is 
uncommon, there is the risk that large volumes of frivolous appeals may 
overwhelm the determination of meritorious ones: “The cause of fairness is 
hardly served when judicial rolls are crammed with futile appeals which 
delay the hearings of better ones, to the detriment of the appellants awaiting 
their determination, often in gaol.”72 
A final argument made during the nineteenth century was that 
introducing a right of appeal would make juries more inclined to error.73 
Appeals, so the logic went, would undermine the sense of responsibility felt 
by jury members. Lord Bougham, for example, suggested that the prospect 
of errors being remedied on appeal would reduce “that sort of awful feeling 
of responsibility under which both judge, prosecutor’s and prisoner’s 
counsel, and jury act” and result in very frequent errors.74 Similarly, Sir 
William Grantham, in 1907, expressed concern that the Criminal Appeal 
Act would make juries “less mindful of giving prisoners the benefit of the 
doubt.”75 
C. The Origins of the Right to Appeal in Continental Europe 
The criminal appeal in continental Europe has its origins in the 
inquisitorial procedure.76 It emerged much earlier than in England and has 
remained a persistent feature of continental criminal procedure. Indeed 
appeals are now commonly regarded as a fundamental right.77 
Antecedents of the continental criminal appeal are found in Roman 
law.78 Development was interrupted by the middle ages,79 only to re-
 
 69.  Smyth, supra note 10, at 321; Orfield, supra note 8, at 946. See also Berger, supra note 14, at 
25-26. 
 70.  PATTENDEN, supra note 4, at 23; Orfield, supra note 8, at 946. 
 71.  SIBLEY, supra note 63, at 23. 
 72.  S v. Ntuli 1996 (1) SA 1207 (CC) para. 24 (S. Afr.). 
 73.  See PATTENDEN, supra note 4, at 23. 
 74.  SIBLEY, supra note 63, at 21 n.3 (internal quotations omitted). 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  François Garraud, The Different Types of Criminal Procedure, in A. ESMEIN, A HISTORY OF 
CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 9 (John Simpson trans., Little, Brown, and Company 1913) 
(1882) (describing the appeal as one of two institutions, the other being “legal proofs,” characteristic of 
the inquisitorial procedure and destined to limit the power of the judge). 
 77.  See Mirjan Damaska, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE 
L.J. 480, 490 (1974). 
 78.  Jeremiah E. Goulka, The First Constitutional Right to Criminal Appeal: Louisiana’s 
Constitution of 1845 and the Clash of the Common Law and Natural Law Traditions, 17 TUL. EUR. & 
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emerge after 1100 A.D. with the revival of Roman law studies.80 This re-
emergence was primarily for institutional reasons, being intertwined with 
the modern state and continental rulers’ desire to “build bureaucracies to 
establish their control over previously independent provincial and local 
authorities.”81 
During the feudal period and middle ages, justice in France was 
patrimonial, with the right to administer justice dispersed among feudal 
lords.82 Judicial administration was the most important—and pervasive—
function of government and means of control.83 Reestablishing a royal 
system of justice was therefore a fundamental component of a broader 
effort of the Crown “to recapture powers of government that had been 
fragmented and dispersed.”84 As the power of the royalty increased, the 
jurisdiction of the royal courts steadily expanded,85 and the king began to 
assert “a preeminent right of justice throughout the whole kingdom.”86 
“[B]y the middle of the fourteenth century,” Dawson observes, “the 
private jurisdictions almost everywhere had come under the wide umbrella 
of royal appellate review.”87 Over time, the royal courts eventually 
absorbed both the secular (i.e. seigniorial and municipal) and ecclesiastical 
courts. This expansion of royal jurisdiction was achieved through two 
interrelated methods. The first was the creation of royal causes—certain 
proceedings over which crown officers had exclusive jurisdiction.88 The list 
of royal causes expanded rapidly, enlarging the judicial powers of inferior 
royal officers.89 By the end of the thirteenth century, all secular 
jurisdictions were seen as emanating from the king.90 
 
CIV. L.F. 151, 175 (2002) (observing that criminal appeals took the form of an action known as the 
provocatio). But cf. Garraud, supra note 76, at 10 (“[T]he appeal, as we understand it nowadays, did not 
exist under the Roman Republic; it made its appearance under the Empire.”). 
 79.  During the feudal period and the Middle Ages, justice was decentralized. Under the feudal 
system, the lord had jurisdiction over the fiefs and manors of his domain. All feudal courts were courts 
of last resort. A. ESMEIN, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 48-51 (John Simpson 
trans., Little, Brown, and Company 1913) (1882). 
 80.  JOHN P. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES 45 (1960). See also ESMEIN, supra note 769, at 
51. 
 81.  Damaska, supra note 77, at 489. 
 82.  ESMEIN, supra note 769, at 48. 
 83.  DAWSON, supra note 80, at 42-43. 
 84.  Id. at 43. 
 85.  Id. at 50-51. 
 86.  Id. at 51. 
 87.  DAWSON, supra note 80, at 55. 
 88.  ESMEIN, supra note 769, at 51; DAWSON, supra note 80, at 54-55. 
 89.  See ESMEIN, supra note 769, at 51; DAWSON, supra note 80, at 54. 
 90.  ESMEIN, supra note 769, at 51. 
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The appeal was the second method associated with the growth of royal 
power. As this power expanded, it was necessary to ensure it remained 
subject to central control.91 Appeals provided the ideal mechanism. Thus, 
from early on, the judicial powers of subordinate royal officers were 
subject to appellate oversight.92 This system of royal appellate procedure in 
turn influenced the widespread development of appeals within feudal 
systems.93 Gradually, the royal courts began to exercise direct appellate 
control over the seigniorial courts.94 
Roman-canon procedure also had a significant influence.95 Within the 
strict hierarchy of the ecclesiastical courts, a system of appeals was 
standard.96 By the time monarchical reconstruction began, this procedure 
had developed to the point where it presented as a viable model for the 
royal courts. Canonist appeals were characterized by full-scale de novo 
review97 and the use of examining commissions and written evidence. As 
Dawson observes, “[t]he canonist appeal, with its full rehearing on both 
law and facts, was an efficient instrument of direct control.”98 This type of 
review ideally suited the political ends of the Crown, by subjecting 
seigniorial courts to royal oversight.99 
By 1670, and probably considerably earlier,100 a generous system of 
criminal appeals was established in France.101 In many cases, appeals were 
automatic.102 Lodging an appeal suspended the execution of sentence, and 
the prosecution had the right to appeal against either an acquittal or the 
sentence imposed.103 
 
 91.  DAWSON, supra note 80, at 55. 
 92.  Id. at 54. 
 93.  Id. at 55-56. 
 94.  ESMEIN, supra note 769, at 51-52. 
 95.  JOHN H. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE: ENGLAND, GERMANY, 
FRANCE 211 (1974) (arguing that the “main element” in the development of French criminal procedure 
was the adoption of Roman-canon procedure). 
 96.  ESMEIN, supra note 769, at 50 (observing that appeals were taken from the official to the 
archbishop, then to the primate, and, finally, to the Pope, as head and supreme judge of Christendom). 
 97.  DAWSON, supra note 80, at 107. 
 98.  Id. at 108. 
 99.  LANGBEIN, supra note 95, at 214. 
 100.  Indeed the ordinance of Villers-Cotterets, promulgated in 1539, despite its focus on 
expediting proceedings, acknowledged the possibility of appeals. For example, examination of an 
accused under torture was to be promptly executed, if there was no appeal; similarly, sentences were to 
be executed on the day of communication, unless the accused appealed. Id. at 223-43. 
 101.  ESMEIN, supra note 769, at 239 (noting the accused person’s ability to appeal preliminary and 
interlocutory judgments of examination as well as judgments on the merits). 
 102.  Id.; Damaska, supra note 77, at 489 n.11. 
 103.  ESMEIN, supra note 769, at 241 (noting that civil parties also had the ability to appeal). 
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Similar developments occurred in other parts of Europe. By the late 
fifteenth century, full-scale canonist review was well established in 
Germany, also driven by its potential for exerting political power.104 In 
Italy, as Damaska explains, the roots of the right to appeal go similarly 
deep: 
 
Italian medieval lawyers who struck the foundation of continental jus 
commune maintained that an appeal must be permitted both from 
interlocutory decisions (e.g., a decision to extract a confession by 
torture) and from final determination of the trial court. Many authorities 
claimed that custom or statutes could not abolish appeals in criminal 
matters. . . . The judge who refused to transmit an appeal to the superior 
court was liable to punishment.105 
III. THE INSTITUTIONAL ROLES OF THE RIGHT TO APPEAL 
We have seen that criminal appeals developed in common law and 
civil law systems for entirely different reasons and at very different times. 
For centuries, continental legal systems permitted intensive review in 
criminal cases, while at the same time appellate oversight in England was 
extraordinarily limited. These historical differences are in part illuminated 
by the fundamentally differing roles that appeals occupy in continental and 
common law systems. 
The most profitable way of analyzing the roles that appeals occupy 
within these legal systems is through what Damaska describes as the 
hierarchical and coordinate models of authority.106 These models, with their 
focus on the way in which a legal system conceives of the proper 
organization of authority, help explain many of the differences not 
illuminated by the trial-centric inquisitorial/adversarial dichotomy. 
Continental systems tend to adopt a hierarchical model of authority. 
The pre-eminent goal of such a system is certainty in decision-making, 
rather than individualized justice.107 Continental systems achieve this goal 
through uniform policies that are administered by a centralized authority 
via a rigid hierarchical structure. Decision-makers are technical experts 
with carefully delineated spheres of exclusive jurisdiction. The application 
of precise guidelines is favored over the exercise of official discretion. 
Within this model, a key method of ensuring uniformity is 
comprehensive appellate review. Thus, the development of criminal 
 
 104.  See DAWSON, supra note 80, at 107. 
 105.  Damaska, supra note 77, at 489 n.11 (internal citations omitted). 
 106.  Id. at 481-82. 
 107.  Id. at 483. 
MARSHALL 11_17_11 FINAL 2(DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2011  7:11 PM 
2011] A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT TO APPEAL 15 
appeals in continental legal systems was closely associated with the 
rebuilding of the monarchy and the associated need for centralized control 
over the administration of justice. 
Control is most effectively exercised where appeals are broad in 
scope, involving complete reconsideration of the case: thus canonist 
procedure, under which questions of law, factual findings and the sentence 
imposed are all reviewable, was an ideal fit.108 The strict record-keeping 
requirements in hierarchical systems further facilitates comprehensive 
review: the written dossier is “the backbone of criminal proceedings.”109 
Given the importance of appellate review to exerting hierarchical 
control, it is not surprising that appeals are generally as of right and, in 
many countries, are regarded as a constitutional right.110 Furthermore, 
appeals are encouraged: the process is inexpensive and without risk to the 
appellant. The combination of appeals being as of right and wide in scope 
necessitates considerable judicial resources. Thus, by the beginning of the 
seventeenth century in France, Dawson estimates that there were 
approximately 1,200 judges in supreme appellate courts alone—many more 
would have occupied intermediate appellate courts.111 
Because reconsideration of first instance decisions is standard, appeals 
in hierarchical systems are regarded as a continuation of the trial process.112 
This explains why appeals against acquittals do not violate the rule against 
double jeopardy and why the execution of judgments is automatically 
stayed pending determination of an appeal. 
Standing in contradistinction is the coordinate model, which 
characterizes common law systems. Under this model, the primary 
objective is to “reach[] the decision most appropriate to the circumstances 
of each case.”113 Coordinate systems are decentralized, made up of loosely 
connected webs of autonomous decision-makers.114 Official discretion and 
flexible standards are common. Particularized justice is valued over 
certainty. Crucial decisions may be entrusted to bodies of independent 
laypeople, because decisions are to be tailored to unique circumstances as 
 
 108.  See id. at 490. 
 109.  Id. at 507. 
 110.  Id. at 490. 
 111.  DAWSON, supra note 80, at 71. 
 112.  Damaska, supra note 77, at 491. 
 113.  Id. at 509. 
 114.  See DAWSON, supra note 80, at 274 (arguing that the English central government adopted a 
“general policy of abstention”). 
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they arise, rather than reached through the technical application of strict 
rules.115 
Even coordinate systems recognize the need for a degree of 
uniformity. Mild hierarchical structures of authority may therefore be 
erected when necessary. Such developments are characteristically difficult. 
Historically, criminal cases involved one-level, local adjudication; review 
by the central courts was rare.116 The trial became the embodiment of the 
entire criminal process, and its conclusion ended the proceedings.117 Thus, 
appellate review was a comparatively recent development in the English-
speaking world. Even today, it can be relatively limited in scope: acquittals 
often cannot be appealed, and challenges to factual findings or the sentence 
imposed are comparatively difficult. Moreover, appellate courts do not 
approach their task de novo, instead restricting their search to identifiable 
errors.118 Perhaps even more fundamentally, appellate courts consider only 
the propriety of the material submitted to the decision-maker and the 
instructions given for its use; it is considered illegitimate to ask whether 
“correct” use was made of the material or the correct result reached.119 
IV. THE MODERN APPROACH TO THE RIGHT TO APPEAL 
The foregoing discussion has traced the origins of the right to appeal 
in two separate systems. It has demonstrated that the historical foundations 
and institutional roles of appeals in these systems are largely distinct. 
During the twentieth century, the picture changes. Increasingly, the 
right to appeal is conceptualized as a right possessed by individuals. In 
many jurisdictions, it is regarded as fundamental; in others, where the right 
 
 115.  Damaska, supra note 77, at 510. 
 116.  See DAWSON, supra note 80, at 71 (noting that from 1300 to 1800 the judges of the English 
central courts of common law and Chancery, who conducted all of the appellate review that English 
central courts undertook, rarely exceeded fifteen. By the beginning of the seventeenth century, there 
were probably more than 5,000 French royal judges. Even allowing for the fact that France’s population 
was probably four or five times that of England, the difference is vast.). 
 117.  See Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 162 (2000) (“In the appellate 
context, . . . [t]he status of the accused defendant, who retains a presumption of innocence throughout 
the trial process changes dramatically when a jury returns a guilty verdict.”). See also Ross v. Moffitt, 
417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974) (“[T]here are significant differences between the trial and appellate stages of 
a criminal proceeding. The purpose of the trial stage from the State’s point of view is to convert a 
criminal defendant from a person presumed innocent to one found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . 
By contrast, it is ordinarily the defendant, rather than the State, who initiates the appellate process, 
seeking not to fend off the efforts of the State’s prosecutor but rather to overturn a finding of guilt made 
by a judge or a jury below.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 118.  See Damaska, supra note 77, at 515. 
 119.  Id. 
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does not reach that status, its ubiquity nevertheless suggests that it is 
regarded as a highly important feature of a fair criminal justice system. 
This Part considers the ways in which the courts in a diverse range of 
jurisdictions now conceptualize the right of appeal. The primary focus is on 
appeals as a right of criminal procedure, rather than on differences in 
appellate structures, standards, or rules. That focus guides the selection of 
jurisdictions. The Part begins by discussing the jurisprudence of two 
multilateral bodies, the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the 
European Court of Human Rights, which respectively oversee the 
implementation of the right in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (hereinafter the ICCPR) and the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter the 
European Convention). The jurisprudence of these bodies is of direct 
application to the right of appeal as guaranteed in both continental Europe 
and in common law countries. However, before discussing the European 
Convention jurisprudence, which is superior law in Europe, this Part 
considers the right of appeal in contemporary France, Germany, and Italy. 
Next, the Part surveys the domestic jurisprudence of two nations in which 
the right of appeal is recognized as a fundamental human right, South 
Africa and New Zealand. Finally, the Part considers the right in the context 
of the federal jurisdictions of the United States and Canada, in which 
statutory rights of appeal are ubiquitous but not constitutionally 
guaranteed.120 
A. The Right to Appeal under the ICCPR 
Article 14(5) of the ICCPR guarantees a right of appeal in broad and 
unequivocal terms: “Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to 
his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according 
to law.”121 
This right was proposed relatively late in the gestation of the ICCPR. 
It was seen primarily as a mechanism for examining whether the right to a 
fair trial had been respected. The initial proponent of the right, the Israeli 
Delegate, Mr. Baror, did not have a specific remedy in mind, such as an 
appeal at which new evidence could be presented. He instead envisaged a 
more general right of review.122 
 
 120.  The United Kingdom is not discussed because it does not currently have any jurisprudence on 
the appeal as a right of criminal procedure. It is one of only five members of the Council of Europe not 
to have ratified Protocol No. 7 of the European Convention. See infra, note 173. 
 121.  Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14(5), Dec. 19, 1966, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 
95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 175 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 122.  TRECHSEL, supra note 7, at 361. 
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The right to appeal is situated within article 14, which guarantees the 
right to a fair trial and aims at “ensuring the proper administration of 
justice.”123 A number of the fair trial rights in article 14 are directly 
applicable to appeals. The right to be tried without undue delay, for 
example, can be violated by appellate delay.124 Similarly, the requirements 
that hearings be both fair and public apply equally on appeal.125 
States parties to the ICCPR are given considerable latitude in 
determining the “modalities” by which they secure article 14(5).126 The 
United Nations Human Rights Committee (hereinafter the Committee) has, 
however, delineated, in fairly robust terms, the essential features of this 
right: substantive review of conviction and sentence; and effective access 
to the appellate system. 
The first core feature of the right to appeal concerns the nature of the 
review. The Committee has repeatedly emphasized that, in order for there 
to be compliance with article 14(5), the conviction and sentence must be 
“review[ed] substantively, both on the basis of sufficiency of the evidence 
and of the law, . . . such that the procedure allows for due consideration of 
the nature of the case.”127 The Committee’s focus is always on the 
substance or adequacy of the review, not the name given to the remedy.128 
It should be noted at this point that although the Committee’s 
decisions are often not treated as strictly binding by domestic courts, its 
interpretation of the ICCPR is influential. For example, in Vazquez v. 
 
 123.  U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 32, para. 2, U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/GC/32 
(Aug. 23, 2007) [hereinafter General Comment 32]. 
 124.  See id. para. 49; Siewpersaud v. Trinidad and Tobago, Views, Human Rights Comm. 81st 
Sess., July 5-30, 2004, para. 6.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/D/938/2000 (July 29, 2004); Evans v. Trinidad 
and Tobago, Views, Human Rights Comm. 77th Sess., Mar.17-Apr. 4, 2003, para. 6.3, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/77/D/908/2000 (Mar. 21, 2003); Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago, Views, Human Rights 
Comm. 74th Sess., Oct. 18-Nov. 5, 1999, para. 6.5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/67/D/845/1999 (Mar. 26, 
2002); Sextus v. Trinidad and Tobago, Views, Human Rights Comm. 72d Sess., July 9-27, 2001, para. 
7.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/72/D/818/1998 (July 16, 2001); Daley v. Jamaica, Views, Human Rights 
Comm. 63d Sess., July 13-31, 1998, para. 7.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/63/D/750/1997 (July 31, 1998); 
Fuenzalida v. Ecuador, Views, Human Rights Comm. 57th Sess., July 8-26, 1996, para. 9.6, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/57/D/480/1991 (July 12, 1996). 
 125.  U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 13, para. 17, U.N. Doc. No. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1 (Apr. 13, 1984). 
 126.  General Comment 32, supra note 123, para. 45; Sanchez v. Spain, Views, Human Rights 
Comm. 88th Sess., Oct. 16-Nov. 3, 2006, para. 7.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/88/D/1332/2004 (Oct. 31, 
2006). 
 127.  General Comment 32, supra note 123, para. 48; Bandajevsky v. Belarus, Views, Human 
Rights Comm. 86th Sess., Mar. 13-31, 2006, para. 10.13, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/86/D/1100/2002 (Mar. 
28, 2006); Aboushanif v. Norway, Views, Human Rights Comm. 93d Sess., July 7-25, 2008, para. 7.2, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/93/D/1542/2007(July 17, 2008). 
 128.  Vazquez v. Spain, Views, Human Rights Comm. 69th Sess., July 10-28, 2000, para. 11.1, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/69/D/701/1996 (July 20, 2000). 
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Spain, the Committee found that the Spanish appellate remedy in issue 
violated article 14(5) because it was limited to the formal or legal aspects 
of the conviction.129 In response to this decision and others like it, Spain 
introduced legislative amendments expanding the number of cases in which 
full appellate review is available.130 Further, in Rodriguez v. Spain, the 
Committee quoted the Supreme Court acknowledging that the right to an 
appeal in cassation had “broadened to an extraordinary degree” such that “a 
decision on evidence can be corrected . . . when the court that heard the 
case departed from the rules of logic, the axioms of experience or scientific 
knowledge.”131 
Article 14(5) is concerned with substance rather than form. A sharp 
focus on the actual scope of the review is thus balanced by a much less 
intrusive approach to the modalities of review. It is not necessary for a full 
retrial to be conducted,132 let alone an oral hearing held.133 Systems 
whereby an appeal is only with leave are not per se incompatible with 
article 14(5), provided that the application for leave entails a full review of 
the conviction and sentence.134 It is thus essential that the particular remedy 
in question provide the opportunity for an adequate review: it may not, for 
example, be limited to the grounds of arbitrariness or denial of justice135 or 
to points of law.136 It is also crucial that convicted people have the right to 
seek review; a process that is discretionary violates article 14(5).137 
It should be emphasized that the adequacy of review depends on the 
“nature of the case” in issue. An appellate tribunal is only required to 
 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE COMMITTEE, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF 
THE FINDINGS OF UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES, para. 38 (2004), available at 
http://www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/3B0BF58A-C096-4113-830E8E1B5BC6DEC5. 
 131.  Rodriguez v. Spain, Views, Human Rights Comm. 94th Sess., Oct. 13-31, 2009, para. 2.3, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/94/D/1489/2006 (Oct. 30, 2008) (internal quotations omitted). 
 132.  Sama v. Germany, Views, Human Rights Comm. 96th Sess., July 13-31, 2009, para. 6.8, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/96/D/1771/2008 (July 28, 2009); Ucles v. Spain, Views, Human Rights Comm. 96th 
Sess., July 13-31, 2009, para. 11.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/96/D/1364/2005 (July 22, 2009); Martinez v. 
Spain, Views, Human Rights Comm. 97th Sess., Oct. 12-30, 2009, para. 9.3, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/97/D/1363/2005 (Oct. 19, 2009). 
 133.  Bryhn v. Norway, Views, Human Rights Comm. 67th Sess., Oct. 18-Nov. 5, 1999, para. 4.6, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/67/D/789/1997 (Oct. 29, 1999). 
 134.  Lumley v. Jamaica, Views, Human Rights Comm. 65th Sess., Mar. 22-Apr. 9, 1999, para. 7.3, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/65/D/662/1995 (Mar. 31, 1999). 
 135.  Cabriada v. Spain, Views, Human Rights Comm. 82nd Sess., Oct. 18-Nov. 5, 2004, para. 7.3, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/1101/2002 (Nov. 1, 2004). 
 136.  Domukovsky v. Georgia, Views, Human Rights Comm. 62d Sess., Mar. 23-Apr. 9, 1998, 
para. 18.11, U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/62/D/623/1995 (Apr. 6, 1988). 
 137.  Ratiani v. Georgia, Views, Human Rights Comm. 84th Sess., July 11-29, 2005, paras. 11.2-
11.3, U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/84/D/975/2001 (July 21, 2005). 
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address “those issues that are pertinent.”138 Thus, when examining 
communications, the Committee’s inquiry is case-specific, concerning the 
adequacy of the particular review in issue, not the technical jurisdictional 
limits of the proceedings. In a raft of communications in respect of Spain, 
the Committee has rejected arguments that proceedings seeking cassation, 
an extraordinary remedy that can only be invoked on specific grounds 
defined by law, necessarily violate article 14(5).139 The crucial issue is 
whether the tribunal adequately considered the grounds that were raised by 
the appellant, including challenges on the facts. 
The Committee’s jurisprudence in relation to the scope of appeals 
displays a troubling tendency to consider only whether the grounds of 
appeal raised by the appellant were adequately appraised. The problem 
with this reasoning is illustrated by Lovell v. Australia.140 Lovell was 
convicted by the Supreme Court of Western Australia of contempt of court 
for his use of documents that had been disclosed for the purposes of 
industrial proceedings. A large fine was imposed. Because an appellate 
 
 138.  Kharkhal v. Belarus, Decision, Human Rights Comm. 91st Sess., Oct. 15-Nov. 2, 2007, para. 
6.5, U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/91/D/1161/2003 (Oct. 31, 2007). 
 139.  In a large number of cases, the Committee found article 14(5) had not been violated because, 
in cassation proceedings, the grounds of appeal had been considered thoroughly: Martinez v. Spain, 
Decision, Human Rights Comm. 94th Sess., Oct. 13-31, 2008, para. 6.5, U.N. Doc. No. 
CCPR/C/94/D/1490/2006 (Oct. 30, 2008); Rodriguez v. Spain, Decision, Human Rights Comm. 94th 
Sess., Oct. 12-30, 2009, para. 6.4, U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/94/D/1489/2006 (Oct. 30, 2008); Dominguez 
v. Spain, Decision, Human Rights Comm. 97th Sess., Oct.12-30, 2009, para. 6.4, U.N. Doc. No. 
CCPR/C/97/D/1471/2006 (Oct. 27, 2009); Gonzalez v. Spain, Decision, Human Rights Comm. 87th 
Sess., July 10-28, 2006, para. 4.3, U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/87/D/1441/2005 (July 25, 2006); Casado v. 
Spain, Decision, Human Rights Comm. 84th Sess., July 11-29, 2005, para. 4.4, U.N. Doc. No. 
CCPR/C/84/D/1399/2005 (July 25, 2005); Alonso v. Spain, Decision, Human Rights Comm. 90th 
Sess., July 9-27, 2007, para. 6.6, U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/90/D/1391/2005 (July 24, 2007); Galvez v. 
Spain, Decision, Human Rights Comm. 84th Sess., July 11-29, 2005, para. 4.5, U.N. Doc. No. 
CCPR/C/84/D/1389/2005 (July 25, 2005); Castro v. Spain, Views, Human Rights Comm. 95th Sess., 
Mar. 16-Apr. 3, 2009, para. 9.2, U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/95/D/1388/2005 (Mar. 19, 2009); Piñeiro v. 
Spain, Decision, Human Rights Comm. 87th Sess., July 10-28, 2006, para. 6.2, U.N. Doc. No. 
CCPR/C/87/D/1387/2005 (July 25, 2006); Gueorguiev v. Spain, Decision, Human Rights Comm. 90th 
Sess., June 9-27, 2007, para. 6.6, U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/90/D/1386/2005 (July 24, 2007); Beisti v. 
Spain, Decision, Human Rights Comm. 92d Sess., Mar. 17-Apr. 4, 2008, para. 6.4, U.N. Doc. No. 
CCPR/C/92/D/1375/2005 (Apr. 1, 2008); Roche v. Spain Decision, Human Rights Comm. 90th Sess., 
July 9-27, 2007, para. 6.5, U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/90/D/1370/2005 (July 24, 2007); Piscioneri v. 
Spain, Views, Human Rights Comm. 96th Sess., July 13-31, 2009, para. 9.2, U.N. Doc. No. 
CCPR/C/96/D/1366/2005 (July 22, 2009). However, in Ucles v. Spain, Views, Human Rights Comm. 
96th Sess., July 13-31, 2009, para. 11.2-11.3, U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/96/D/1364/2005 (July 22, 2009) 
and Martinez v. Spain, Views, Human Rights Comm. 97th Sess., Oct. 12-31, 2009, paras. 9.2-9.3, U.N. 
Doc. No. CCPR/C/97/D/1363/2005 (Oct. 19, 2009) the Committee found that article 14(5) had been 
violated because the Supreme Court of Spain, in cassation proceedings, had held that it was not able to 
reassess the evidence evaluated by the trial judge. 
 140.  Lovell v. Australia, Views, Human Rights Comm. 80th Sess., Mar. 15-Apr. 2, U.N. Doc. No. 
CCPR/C/80/D/920/2000 (Mar. 24, 2003). 
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court had determined the case at first instance, Lovell’s only avenue for 
review was an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court of 
Australia. He filed an application challenging his conviction and sentence. 
Special leave, available only on questions of law of public importance, was 
refused. Lovell complained to the Committee, which found that article 
14(5) had not been violated. It avoided considering the narrow 
jurisdictional limitations imposed on the applications to the High Court, 
instead holding that Lovell had “raised only certain specific questions of 
law and did not seek a full review of the conviction.”141 But this reasoning 
misses the crucial point that Lovell had no legal right to seek a full review 
of his conviction: he was legally required to restrict his grounds for leave 
to questions of law that were of “public importance.”142 By ignoring this 
institutional restriction, the Committee failed to address the real complaint. 
The second core feature of the right to appeal is the obligation to 
ensure effective access to the right. This feature of the Committee’s 
jurisprudence clarifies an ambiguity latent in the text of article 14(5). The 
right to appeal is framed in passive terms: it is a right to “have . . . [one’s] 
conviction and sentence . . . reviewed.” On its face, this could suggest an 
obligation to review every conviction and sentence that is imposed. This is 
not, however, the proper interpretation. The right to appeal is an 
opportunity right,143 which must be asserted personally by a convicted 
person. The state’s obligation is to establish a system that allows the right 
to be exercised effectively, when a person so desires. 
Providing effective access to the appellate system imposes certain 
specific obligations on the state. A convicted person is entitled to access all 
the documents necessary to pursue an effective appeal. This includes a 
“duly reasoned, written judgment of the trial court” and a transcript of the 
trial.144 
Finally, the Committee accepts that reasonable conditions may be 
imposed on appeals. In Kharkhal v. Belarus, the author complained that the 
Supreme Court had rejected his grounds of appeal without any 
 
 141.  Id. para. 8.4. 
 142.  Id. para. 3.3. Note also that it is difficult to accept that Lovell had the right to challenge his 
sentence, given the requirement of public importance. 
 143.  See discussion below in Part VI.C. 
 144.  General Comment 32, supra note 123, para. 49. See also Lumley v Jamaica, Views, Human 
Rights Comm. 65th Sess., Mar. 22-Apr. 9, 1999, para. 7.5, U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/65/D/662/1995 
(Mar. 31, 1999) (“[T]he State party should provide the convicted person with access to the judgments 
and documents necessary to enjoy the effective exercise of the right to appeal.”). Clearly, when trial is 
by jury, reasons for conviction are not articulated. In such cases, it is likely that a copy of the trial 
judge’s instructions to the jury would be a substitute. 
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consideration of their merit.145 In holding the communication inadmissible, 
the Committee observed that: 
 
the right to a review of a criminal conviction by a higher tribunal, as 
secured by article 14, paragraph 5, implies that the tribunal of review 
adequately addresses those issues that are pertinent, having regard to 
such reasonable conditions as are applicable to appeals under the State 
party’s laws.  Where, as in the present case, the review allows for a re-
examination of facts and evidence, the same principle guides the 
Committee as in other proceedings, namely that it is generally for the 
courts of States parties to the Covenant to evaluate facts and evidence in 
a particular case, unless it can be ascertained that the conduct of the trial 
or the evaluation of facts and evidence or interpretation of legislation 
was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice.146 
B. The Right to Appeal in France, Germany, and Italy 
Before considering the substance of the right to appeal under the 
European Convention, it is useful to sketch briefly the rights of appeal 
currently applying in the three European jurisdictions that were mentioned 
in our historical survey: France, Germany, and Italy. It should be apparent, 
and unsurprising, that appellate systems differ considerably within Europe. 
The supremacy of the European Convention, however, reduces the 
significance of these differences, allowing a brief survey to suffice. 
In France, appeals often proceed de novo.147 The particular scope of an 
appeal depends on the court from which the appeal is taken. The 
overwhelming majority of appeals are from correctional or contravention 
courts (in which all but the most serious of felonies are tried). While these 
appeals may be heard de novo, the hearing begins with an oral report of the 
case from one of the two associate appeals judges, and the court may refuse 
to hear witnesses who gave evidence in the first trial (other than the 
accused).148 In contrast, appeals from the Assize Court (a specialist court in 
which only major felonies are tried)149 are entirely de novo; they do not 
begin with an oral report, although the lower court’s verdict and judgment 
 
 145.  Kharkhal v. Belarus, Decision, Human Rights Comm. 91st Sess., Oct. 15-Nov. 2, 2007, para. 
2.4, U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/95/D/1161/2005 (Oct. 31, 2007). 
 146.  Id. para. 6.5 (emphasis added). 
 147.  Richard S. Frase, France, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 201, 235 (Craig 
M. Bradley ed., 2d ed. 2007). 
 148.  Id. at 236. 
 149.  In French law, major felonies carry a maximum penalty of either life imprisonment or 
imprisonment for ten years or more. See id. at 202. 
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are read.150 Further recourse may be had to the Court of Cassation on issues 
of law;151 review at this level is entirely on the record.152 
In Germany, appeals are as of right against all trial judgments.153 Like 
France, the scope of review depends on the court from which the appeal is 
taken. The pattern described above is, however, reversed, with narrower 
review applying to convictions for more serious offences: appeals against 
judgments of the local court (in which less serious trials occur) may be 
brought on questions of both fact and law, resulting in de novo review; 
appeals from the district court (in which more serious criminal cases are 
tried) are only on questions of law.154 General appeals (i.e. on questions of 
fact and law) result in a new trial on issues of guilt and sentence. The court 
is required to collect and present all the evidence (including new evidence) 
necessary to reach its judgment.155 Indeed, it is unnecessary for the 
appellant to raise any concerns with the first instance judgment at all, and 
doing so does not affect the court’s duty to re-investigate the entire case.156 
Appeals on legal grounds are more limited, involving an examination 
of the lower court’s decision.157 Relatively thorough review is, however, 
still possible, because all first-instance judgments are supported by written 
reasons that include findings of fact and explain how the law was applied to 
those facts.158 Nevertheless, the appellant must identify and explain the 
grounds of appeal.159 Few such appeals proceed to an oral hearing, with 
 
 150.  Id. at 236. 
 151.  Id. at 237 (noting that recognized grounds for reversal include insufficient reasoning or lack 
of legal basis). 
 152.  Id. at 241. 
 153.  Thomas Weigend, Germany, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 
147, at 243, 268. 
 154.  Gerhard Dannecker & Julian Roberts, The Law of German Criminal Procedure, in 
INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW 419, 446-47 (Mathias Reimann & Joachim Zekoll eds., 2d ed. 2005) 
(noting that the propriety of having a simpler appellate process for more serious criminal cases has been 
a matter of debate for some time). Langbein gives two explanations for the fact that more liberal 
appellate review is available for the least serious cases. First, the procedure in the lower courts is more 
summary in nature, with the accused often unrepresented, and there is a greater danger that the 
prosecution and the court may be less thorough. Second, because the convictions are imposed 
“according to the subjective persuasion of its members” (compared with an objectively required 
“quantum of proof”) and lower court proceedings only involve one professional judge, there is a sense 
that “conviction ought not to turn upon the persuasion of a single professional judge if a litigant is 
dissatisfied with the result.” JOHN H. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY 78-
79, 83-84 (1977). 
 155.  Weigend, supra note 153, at 269. 
 156.  Id. at 268. 
 157.  Dannecker & Roberts, supra note 154, at 447. 
 158.  LANGBEIN, supra note 154, at 84. 
 159.  Weigend, supra note 153, at 269. 
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most rejected on the papers as “obviously unfounded.”160 No inquiry is 
ordinarily made into the trial court’s fact-finding,161 largely because the 
formal minutes of the trial usually say nothing about the evidence given.162 
In Italy, appeals remain an integral part of the criminal process and are 
as of right from any court of first instance.163 They are conceived of as a 
continuation of the trial.164 At the first appellate level, full de novo review 
will take place, if sought,165 involving a second complete adjudication of all 
factual and legal issues and the hearing of new evidence.166 No deference is 
given to the lower court’s decision. Further, the Italian Constitution 
guarantees a right of review in all cases affecting personal liberty to the 
final criminal court of appeal, the Corte di Cassazione (Court of 
Cassation), comprising over three hundred judges.167 Review at this second 
tier is limited to questions of law.168 
C. The Right to Appeal under the European Convention 
The European Convention does not require states to provide a system 
of appellate review.169 However, if a right of appeal is granted, article 6, 
guaranteeing the right to a fair trial, applies to the proceedings.170 
The right to appeal is instead found in article 2 of Protocol No. 7 to 
the European Convention.171 This Protocol is a relatively recent addition to 
 
 160.  Id. at 268. 
 161.  But see id. at 270-71 (arguing that recently the scope of review has expanded to allow various 
challenges to the substantive correctness of the lower court judgment). 
 162.  Id. at 270. Although if the formal minutes do contain substantive information, the appellant 
may challenge the trial court’s fact-finding by showing that the judgment contained factual errors. 
 163.  In 1988, a new code of criminal procedure was enacted, reframing criminal proceedings as 
adversarial contests rather than inquisitions. Despite this radical change, it is notable that criminal 
appeals remained significantly hierarchical in nature. Stephen P. Freccero, An Introduction to the New 
Italian Criminal Procedure, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 345, 346-49 (1994) (outlining the 1988 reforms); see 
generally Ennio Amodio, The Accusatorial System Lost and Regained: Reforming Criminal Procedure 
in Italy, 52 AM. J. CRIM. L. 489 (2004). 
 164.  Rachel A. Van Cleave, Italy, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 
147, at 303, 330-31. 
 165.  Freccero, supra note 163, at 380 (observing that the parties may narrow the scope of the 
appeal by selecting particular issues). 
 166.  Id. at 379 (comparing Italian appeals with American appellate review). 
 167.  Art. 111 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.).; Freccero, supra note 163, at 350. 
 168.  Freccero, supra note 163, at 381. 
 169.  TRECHSEL, supra note 7, at 363. 
 170.  Poulsen v. Denmark, App. No. 32092/96, Section II, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
HUDOC, at 5 (June 29, 2000), http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (“As far as Article 6 is concerned the 
Court recalls that this provision does not compel the Contracting States to set up courts of appeal but 
where such courts do exist, the guarantees of Article 6 must be complied with”). 
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the Convention, having only opened for signature in 1984. Although it was 
not initially met with great enthusiasm,172 almost every member state of the 
Council of Europe has now ratified the Protocol.173 And membership of the 
Council of Europe is currently contingent on ratification of the entire 
“parcel” of rights in the European Convention and its protocols.174 Article 2 
of Protocol No. 7 has thus brought the appellate systems of almost all of 
continental Europe under the oversight of the European Court of Human 
Rights. It is to that Court’s jurisprudence we now turn. 
Under the European Convention, states have a significant degree of 
discretion as to the modalities of appellate review as well as the grounds on 
which it may be exercised.175 This “wide margin of appreciation”176 has 
been attributed to the large variety of types of appeal that exist in 
Europe.177 Thus, a state will have complied with article 2 of Protocol No. 7 
where it grants defendants the right to apply for leave to appeal178 or even 
when review is restricted to points of law.179 Moreover, states are entitled 
to impose restrictions that regulate access to appellate review. These 
restrictions must, however, pursue a legitimate aim and not infringe the 
very essence of the right.180 
 
 171.  Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, art. 2, Nov. 22, 1984, E.T.S. No. 117 [hereinafter Protocol No. 7 to the ECHR] (“1. 
Everyone convicted of a criminal offence by a tribunal shall have the right to have his conviction or 
sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal. The exercise of this right, including the grounds on which it 
may be exercised, shall be governed by law. 2. This right may be subject to exceptions in regard to 
offences of a minor character, as prescribed by law, or in cases in which the person concerned was tried 
in the first instance by the highest tribunal or was convicted following an appeal against acquittal.”) 
[hereinafter Protocol No. 7 to the ECHR]. 
 172.  TRECHSEL, supra note 7, at 362 (explaining that it took four years to collect the seven 
signatures required for the Protocol to enter into force). 
 173.  The only exceptions are Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Turkey and the United Kingdom. 
Treaty Office, Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms CETS No.:117, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://conventions.coe.int (click “Full List,” then click 
document no. 117, “Protocol 7 . . . ,” then click “Chart of signatures and ratifications”) (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2011). 
 174.  TRECHSEL, supra note 7, at 362. 
 175.  Poulsen v. Denmark, App. No. 32092/96, Section II, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
HUDOC, at 5 (June 29, 2000), http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. 
 176.  Krombach v. France, App. No. 29731/96, Section III, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
HUDOC, para. 96 (Feb. 13, 2001), http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. 
 177.  See Protocol No. 7 to the ECHR (explanatory report), supra note 171, para. 18, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/HTML/117.htm. 
 178.  Lantto v. Finland, App. No. 27665/95, Section IV, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
HUDOC, at 14-15 (July 12, 1999), http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. 
 179.  Krombach, App. No. 29731/96, paras. 96-97. 
 180.  Gurepka v. Ukraine, App. No. 61406/00, Section II, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
HUDOC, para. 59 (Sept. 6, 2005), http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. 
MARSHALL 11_17_11 FINAL 2 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2011  7:11 PM 
26 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 22:1 
It is difficult to determine precisely what constitutes “the very 
essence” of the right to appeal. It does not appear to relate closely to the 
scope of review: as has been noted, states are not required to extend 
appellate review to the merits of a conviction;181 similarly, appeals may be 
dismissed without consideration of the merits for procedural non-
compliance.182 
Instead, the essence of the right is best conceived of as the opportunity 
to access a fair appellate process. As a minimum, this obviously requires 
that a convicted person possess a legal right to appeal. Thus, in Krombach, 
article 2 of Protocol No. 7 was violated because a person convicted in 
absentia had no right to appeal.183 In addition, while a state may require a 
person to obtain permission to appeal, the process must be “clear and 
accessible,”184 and it “must be independent of any discretionary action by 
the authorities.”185 Thus a system requiring leave of the court is 
permissible, but one requiring the consent of the prosecutor is not. 
The opportunity to appeal must be capable of being exercised by the 
convicted person.186 Gurepka v. Ukraine establishes this point.187 Gurepka, 
who worked in a prosecutors’ office, was sentenced to administrative 
detention for contempt of court. His employer (i.e., a prosecutor) brought 
an “extraordinary appeal,” which was unsuccessful. Only a prosecutor or 
the president of the higher court could initiate this procedure. The 
European Court held that Gurepka’s right to appeal had been violated: the 
 
 181.  Loewenguth v. France, App. No. 53183/99, Section III, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS: HUDOC, at 3 (May 30, 2000), http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. Note, however, that France 
filed a reservation to article 2 of Protocol No. 7 to the ECHR, stating “the review by a higher court may 
be limited to a control of the application of the law, such as an appeal to the Supreme Court.” However, 
in Pesti & Frodl v. Austria, App. No. 27618/95, Section III, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
HUDOC (Jan. 18, 2000), http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc, the Court rejected as manifestly ill-founded 
an argument that an appeal restricted to procedural defects at the trial did not comply with article 2 of 
Protocol No. 7. Id. at 12. 
 182.  Sjöö v. Sweden, App. No. 37604/97, Second Chamber, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS: HUDOC, at 5 (Oct. 21, 1998), http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (upholding the dismissal of an 
appeal due to the appellant’s failure to appear at the hearing without lawful excuse). 
 183.  Krombach, App. No. 29731/96, paras. 96-100 (Feb. 13, 2001). 
 184.  Galstyan v. Armenia, App. No. 26986/03, Section III, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 
paras. 125-26 (Nov. 15, 2007), http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (upholding the dismissal of an appeal 
due to the appellant’s failure to appear at the hearing without lawful excuse and finding a violation 
where there was only a power of discretionary review that lacked “any clearly defined procedure or 
time-limits and consistent application in practice”). 
 185.  Gurepka, App. No. 61406/00, para. 59. 
 186.  See Lantto v. Finland, App. No. 27665/95, Section IV, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS: HUDOC, at 14 (July 12, 1999), http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (noting that the applicants 
had “exercised their right of appeal”). 
 187.  Gurepka, App. No. 61406/00, para. 59. 
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procedure was deficient because an appeal “was not directly accessible to a 
party to the proceedings and did not depend on his or her motion and 
arguments.”188 The requirement that review be on the defendant’s motion 
and allow for him or her to present arguments on the issues arising was 
central to the decision.189 Review on a third party’s initiative, particularly 
where the convicted person is not involved in the process, is not sufficient. 
Finally, it should be observed that states are not required to provide 
infinite opportunities to appeal. Reasonable conditions can be imposed on 
the exercise of the right, including time limits for lodging appeals after 
which the appeal need not be accepted.190 Similarly, where an appellant 
fails to attend the hearing, the appeal may legitimately be dismissed 
without considering its merits. Such a rule, the Court has explained, does 
not breach article 2 of Protocol No. 7 because it serves “the good 
administration of justice in that it . . . aim[s] at securing the parties’ 
presence in court and the prompt and thorough examination of the case.”191 
D. The Right to Appeal in South Africa 
In South Africa,192 the right to appeal is guaranteed—as a component 
of the right to a fair trial—by section 35(3)(o) of the Constitution.193 In a 
series of cases since 1996, the Constitutional Court has considered the 
content of this right. 
The essence of the right is the provision of an “opportunity to have 
[one’s] conviction and sentence ‘adequately reappraised.’”194 The purpose 
 
 188.  Id. para. 60. See also Galstyan, App. No. 26986/03, para. 126 (finding a violation where the 
state did not provide “a clear and accessible right to appeal”). 
 189.  Gurepka, App. No. 61406/00, para. 61. 
 190.  Laaksonen v. Finland, App. No. 36321/97, Section IV, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS: HUDOC, at 3  (Sept. 7, 1999), http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. 
 191.  Poulsen v. Denmark, App. No. 32092/96, Section II, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
HUDOC, at 5 (June 29, 2000), http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc; Sjöö v. Sweden, App. No. 37604/97, 
Second Chamber, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: HUDOC, at 5 (Oct. 21, 1998), 
http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. 
 192.  Although technically a hybrid of Roman-Dutch and common law, criminal procedure in 
South Africa was heavily influenced by English law during the twentieth century and is best viewed as 
a predominantly adversarial/common law system. J.R.L. Milton, Criminal Law in South Africa 1976 - 
1986, CILSA 34, 36-37 (1987); Lirieka Meintjes-Van der Walt, A Historical Overview of the Expert in 
the Criminal Justice Process in South Africa, the Netherlands and England and Wales, 8 TILBURG 
FOREIGN L. REV. 217, 227-29 (1999-2000). Substantive criminal law is more in the nature of a hybrid. 
See Fracois du Bois & Daniel Visser, The Influence of Foreign Law in South Africa, 13 TRANSNAT’L L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 593, 618 (2003) (arguing that post-WWII South African criminal law was 
“recast . . .  in a civilian mode after a century and a half of anglicization”). 
 193.  S. AFR. CONST., 1996 s. 35(3) (“Every accused person has a right to a fair trial, which 
includes the right . . .  (o) of appeal to, or review by, a higher court.”) 
 194.  S. v. Shinga 2007 (2) SACR 28 (CC) para. 40 (S. Afr.). 
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of this reappraisal is error correction.195 Like fair trial rights generally, 
appeals are intended “to minimise the risk of wrong convictions and the 
consequent failure of justice.”196 
Resourcing the appellate system is a significant concern in South 
Africa.197 Numerous efforts have been made by the Government to reduce 
the costs associated with criminal appeals by imposing procedural 
restrictions. Invariably these efforts have resulted in constitutional 
challenges. Resolution has forced the Court to address the very real tension 
between full appellate review and the conservation of limited state 
resources. In the process, the scope of the right to appeal has been 
elaborated. 
The Constitutional Court has held that a system requiring leave to 
appeal is not unconstitutional. Such a system may provide for an adequate 
reappraisal of a person’s conviction and sentence. This mirrors the 
approach taken under the European Convention and the ICCPR. In Rens, 
the Court upheld a leave-to-appeal procedure on the basis that it afforded 
the opportunity for a “reassessment of the disputed issues . . . [and] an 
informed decision . . . as to the prospects of success.”198 Similarly, in 
Shinga, the Court observed that, in certain circumstances, an application for 
leave might allow “an adequate reappraisal of whether the applicant . . . 
was correctly convicted and whether the sentence is appropriate.”199 
The Court has identified a number of preconditions to obtaining an 
adequate reappraisal. The first is that a record of the trial must be 
considered.200 Without the record, it is not possible to make an informed 
 
 195.  S. v. Steyn 2001 (1) SA 1146 (CC) para. 23 (S. Afr.) (holding that there must be “a reasonable 
procedure for correcting errors that may have occurred at the trial stage”). 
 196.  S. v. Twala  2000 (1) SA 879 (CC) para. 9 (S. Afr.). 
 197.  The leave to appeal system in issue in Steyn was enacted “to prevent the clogging of appeal 
rolls and to ensure that hopeless appeals did not waste valuable court time.” S. v. Steyn 2001 (1) SA 
1146 (CC) para. 31 (S. Afr.). 
 198.  S. v. Rens 1996 (1) SA 1218 (CC) para. 26 (S. Afr.). 
 199.  S. v. Shinga 2007 (2) SACR 28 (CC) para. 52 (S. Afr.); see also S. v. Steyn 2001 (1) SA 1146 
(CC) para. 36 (S. Afr.) (“A leave to appeal procedure which does not enable an appeal court to make an 
informed decision on the application, and which does not adequately protect against the possibility of 
wrong convictions and inappropriate sentences constitutes a serious limitation of the right to appeal.”). 
 200.  In Shinga, the Court considered a system whereby the record was required to be provided to 
the court considering an application for leave to appeal, except in four situations: where the accused 
was legally represented at the trial; where the accused and the prosecution agree; where the appeal is 
only against sentence; and where the application is for condonation (meaning that due to some 
procedural error, permission is required before the application will be considered). S. v. Shinga 2007 (2) 
SACR 28 (CC) para. 45 (S. Afr.). The Court held that in each of these situations the absence of the trial 
record constituted “an unjustifiable barrier to the right of review or appeal” and was therefore 
unconstitutional. Id. 
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decision on the appeal’s prospects of success:201 the court cannot evaluate 
either the sufficiency of the evidence presented or whether the trial was 
marred by procedural errors.202 Second, the lower court’s reasoned 
judgment should be made available. Third, and unusually, the Court has 
held that applications for leave to appeal must be considered by at least two 
judges of the appellate court.203 This requirement is difficult to explain, 
given that judges sitting alone routinely impose convictions. If one judge 
can adequately appraise the evidence presented at trial, there would appear 
to be nothing inherent in the process of reappraisal that necessitates the 
attention of two judges. Collegial discussion may, as the Court suggests, 
enhance the quality of a decision, but this does not establish that more than 
one judge is a constitutional necessity.204 Finally, dicta of the Court suggest 
that counsel may be necessary at the appellate stage, including when 
preparing an application for leave to appeal.205 
An oral hearing is not treated as a fundamental component of the right 
to appeal. Although oral argument is regarded as the best method for 
ensuring errors are corrected,206 section 35(3)(o) sets a baseline. It is 
accordingly permissible to determine “frivolous and unmeritorious 
appeals” on the papers.207 Appeals that fall outside this narrow category 
must, however, be afforded an oral hearing. Thus a provision requiring that 
appeals ordinarily be determined on the papers was held to breach section 
35(3)(o).208 
South African jurisprudence conceives of the right to appeal as an 
opportunity right. It is a right that must be exercised by a convicted person, 
who is responsible for prosecuting his or her case. The state’s obligation is 
to ensure that each person convicted of a crime has the opportunity to 
advance an appeal. 
 
 201.  S. v. Steyn 2001 (1) SA 1146 (CC) para. 11 (S. Afr.); S. v. Shinga 2007 (2) SACR 28 (CC) 
para. 44 (S. Afr.). 
 202.  S. v. Ntuli 1996 (1) SA 1207 (CC) para. 15 (S. Afr.). 
 203.  S. v. Shinga 2007 (2) SACR 28 (CC) para. 48 (S. Afr.). 
 204.  It is doubtful that this requirement would apply to “full” appeal, given the Court’s reliance on 
this factor was principally seen as necessary to balance the other restrictions inherent in applications for 
leave to appeal that are determined on the papers. Id. para. 46 (observing that in previous cases “this 
Court regarded the fact that applications for leave to appeal from the High Court to the Supreme Court 
of Appeal are, in the first place, considered by two judges as an important pillar in the process of 
finding the application for leave-to-appeal procedure constitutionally valid”). 
 205.  See id. para. 58 (observing that it would be “a matter of grave concern” if counsel is often not 
provided to enable people to prepare applications for leave to appeal). 
 206.  S. v. Steyn 2001 (1) SA 1146 (CC) para. 24 (S. Afr.). 
 207.  Id. para. 23. 
 208.  See S. v. Shinga 2007 (2) SACR 28 (CC) para. 31 (S. Afr.) (holding that such a procedure 
“renders the process of appeal or review unfair and unjust”). 
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E. The Right to Appeal in New Zealand 
New Zealand’s obligations under the ICCPR are affirmed in the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Section 25(h) of that Act provides, as a 
component of the “minimum standards of criminal procedure,” that 
everyone convicted of an offence has the right to appeal against the 
conviction or sentence.209 
Unlike the other instruments discussed so far, the Bill of Rights Act is 
neither entrenched nor supreme. However, wherever an enactment can be 
interpreted consistently with the enumerated rights, that meaning is to be 
preferred.210 If an enactment cannot be interpreted in this manner, courts 
are required to apply the statute despite its inconsistency with the Bill of 
Rights Act.211 This model of a non-entrenched, statutory bill of rights is 
also found in the United Kingdom212 and in two Australian jurisdictions.213 
In the leading case, R v. Taito, the Privy Council held that the right to 
appeal requires provision of “an effective right of appeal which so far as is 
reasonably possible will ensure that justice is done in the appeal 
process.”214 Most fundamentally, the court must consider the merits of an 
appeal.215 Unless the appeal is abandoned, it cannot be disposed of without 
assessing whether the grounds of appeal raised meet the statutory criteria 
for allowing the appeal; there is no power to dismiss an appeal on 
procedural grounds, even where an appellant fails to comply with rules of 
court.216 It is also necessary for the scope of the appeal to extend to permit 
challenges to matters of fact.217 Under New Zealand law, a conviction must 
be set aside if it is “unreasonable,” which necessitates a review of the 
 
 209. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, 1990 S.N.Z. No. 190, § 25(h). 
 210.  Id. § 6. 
 211.  Id. § 4. 
 212.  See  Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K.). 
 213.  See Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vict.) (Austl.); Human Rights 
Act 2004 (Austl. Cap. Terr.) (Austl.). Although the Australian statutes both contain a right to appeal, 
neither jurisdiction has yet considered the content of the right. Id. 
 214.  R v Taito [2002] 3 NZLR 577 (P.C.) 596-97. See also Petryszick v R [2010] NZSC 105 at 
para [2]. 
 215.  Petryszick v R [2010] NZSC 105 at para [2, 32]; R v Taito [2002] 3 NZLR 577 (P.C.) 597-98. 
 216.  Petryszick v R [2010] NZSC 105 at para [35]. See also Petryszick v R [2011] NZSC 72 
(refusing leave to appeal on the basis that the Court of Appeal had addressed the merits of the 
appellant’s grounds of appeal “as best as it could in the circumstances,” given his failure to provide 
written or oral submissions). 
 217.  See R v Owen [2008] 2 NZLR 37 (SC) 45 (referring to article 14(5) of the ICCPR and noting 
that “[t]here is no suggestion in the international jurisprudence that the right of appeal mandated by our 
s. 25(h) and corresponding international provisions should, in the case of factual issues, be different in 
character or more extensive than that provided by s 385(1)(a) [of the Crimes Act 1961]”). 
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evidence presented.218 An appeal is not, however, “a retrial on the written 
record,” and it is the appellant’s responsibility to demonstrate precisely 
why the verdict is unreasonable.219 
Appellate processes must also be fair, as this “help[s] to ensure correct 
decisions on the substance of cases.”220 Proper consideration of the merits 
of an appeal cannot therefore occur unless due process is observed.221 A 
number of procedural requirements have been identified. First, appellants 
are entitled to the materials that are necessary for them to advance their 
grounds of appeal.222 Where relevant, they are entitled to trial transcripts, 
the judge’s instruction to the jury and any rulings made in relation to the 
trial. In this context, the court cannot discriminate by providing these 
documents only to appellants who are legally represented.223 Second, 
appellants are entitled to an oral hearing and, when unrepresented, to be 
present at the hearing.224 This is not, however, an absolute requirement: an 
appeal may be determined without an oral hearing where it “can fairly be 
dealt with on the papers” and “either has no realistic prospect of success or 
clearly should be allowed.”225 Similarly, appellants who willfully fail to 
comply with rules of court may be prevented from participating in an 
appeal.226 Third, appellants must have access to an unbiased court.227 
Finally, where appeals are to be determined by more than one judge,228 it is 
necessary for the judges to meet, in order to “grapple collectively with the 
issues” that are raised.229 
A final feature of the New Zealand jurisprudence is the suggestion that 
it would be inconsistent with the right of appeal to require that leave first 
 
 218.  Id. at 44-45. 
 219.  Id. (noting that the appellate court is not entitled to substitute its own view of the evidence, 
and it should not lightly interfere with the verdict). 
 220.  R v Taito [2002] 3 NZLR 577 (P.C.) 600. 
 221.  Id. at 597. 
 222.  Id. at 600. 
 223.  Id. 
 224.  See id. at 599; R v Smith [2003] 3 NZLR 617 (CA) 633. 
 225.  Crimes Act 1961, § 392A(1) (N.Z.). This power is rarely exercised: in 2008 (the most recent 
year for which statistics are available), only five appeals against conviction or sentence were 
determined on the papers, compared with 307 that received oral hearings.  See Judicial Reports, 
COURTS OF NEW ZEALAND, http://www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/from/judicial-reports. 
 226.  Petryszick v R [2010] NZSC 105 at para [31] Elias CJ for the Court. 
 227.  See R v Taito [2002] 3 NZLR 577 (P.C.) 597-98 (holding that it was inappropriate for a judge 
who had previously considered that the merits of an appeal did not justify a grant of legal aid to then sit 
on the appeal itself). 
 228.  Certain criminal appeals in New Zealand are, however, routinely heard by a High Court judge 
sitting alone. Summary Proceedings Act 1957, 1957 S.N.Z. No. 87, § 115. 
 229.  R v Taito [2002] 3 NZLR at 599. 
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be obtained. After the Bill of Rights was enacted, leave to appeal 
requirements were repealed by Parliament, a decision that received dicta 
approval from the Privy Council in Taito.230 It is, however, acceptable to 
subject second appeals to a leave process.231 
F. The Right to Appeal in the United States 
The United States Constitution does not guarantee a right to an appeal 
in criminal cases.232 Nor is such a right a necessary element of due process: 
 
An appeal from a judgment of conviction is not a matter of absolute 
right, independently of constitutional or statutory provisions allowing 
such appeal. A review by an appellate court of the final judgment in a 
criminal case, however grave the offence of which the accused is 
convicted, was not at common law and is not now a necessary element of 
due process of law. It is wholly within the discretion of the State to allow 
or not to allow such a review.233 
 
States are not required to provide any system of appellate review at 
all.234 If a system is provided, the form it takes is entirely at the state’s 
discretion: a state would hypothetically be entitled to establish a process of 
“nonadversarial reexamination of convictions by a panel of government 
experts.”235 
Notwithstanding these statements, this article has shown that, during 
the twentieth century, the right to appeal became ubiquitous in both federal 
and state criminal justice systems.236 In the federal system, and in most 
 
 230.  See id. (observing that leave to appeal requirements were repealed in response to the 
enactment of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990). 
 231.  See R v Slater [1997] 1 NZLR 211 (CA) 217. 
 232.  The United States has ratified the ICCPR, including article 14(5), but has declared that it is 
non-self-executing. E.g., 138 CONG. REC. S4784 (1992) (the Senate’s “advice and consent” to 
ratification was subject to a declaration that “Articles 1 through 27 of the Covenant are not self-
executing”); White House Statement on Signing the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 28 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1008, 1008-09 (June 5, 1992) 
(declaring the ratification of the ICCPR). 
 233.  McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment did 
not require states to provide a right of appeal in criminal cases). 
 234.  Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956). 
 235.  See Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 165-66 (2000) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
 236.  Indeed, in 1956, the Supreme Court observed that every state provided “some method of 
appeal from criminal convictions.” Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18. 
MARSHALL 11_17_11 FINAL 2(DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2011  7:11 PM 
2011] A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT TO APPEAL 33 
states, this right is purely statutory in nature.237 However, where granted, it 
is subject to the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal 
protection.238 It is therefore possible to get a picture of the minimum 
requirements of a criminal appeal. 
Griffin v. Illinois was a watershed case. Under Illinois law, every 
person convicted of a crime had the right to appeal.239 However, in order to 
get full review of all alleged errors, the appellant was required to purchase 
a transcript of the trial proceedings.240 The Court struck down this 
requirement as unconstitutional. The plurality reasoned that, although not 
required by the Constitution, appellate review had “become an integral part 
of the Illinois trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of 
a defendant” and was subject to the protections of the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses.241 Because the system denied “adequate and 
effective appellate review”242 to those who could not afford transcripts, it 
breached the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Frankfurter concurred in the 
result, focusing on the Equal Protection Clause and emphasizing that 
although states were entitled to regulate the appeal process, they could not 
in doing so produce “squalid discrimination.”243 
In the decades following Griffin, the Supreme Court expanded the 
protections that applied to appellate proceedings. In Douglas v. California, 
the Court held that criminal defendants were entitled to legal representation 
on first appeals as of right.244 In Halbert v. Michigan, this right was 
extended to encompass applications for leave to bring a first appeal.245 
Further, the right to counsel implies the right to the effective assistance of 
counsel,246 who must act as an advocate rather than an amicus.247 The right 
 
 237.  Rosanna Cavallaro, Better Off Dead: Abatement, Innocence, and the Evolving Right of 
Appeal, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 943, 946 (2002) (noting that only eleven states provide in their 
constitutions for an appeal as of right against felony convictions). 
 238.  Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985). 
 239.  Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13 (quoting Illinois law, which provided that “[w]rits of error in all 
criminal cases are writs of right and shall issue as a matter of course.”). 
 240.  See id. at 13-14. In practice, full appellate review is only possible by writ of error when 
accompanied by bill of exceptions or report of proceedings at the trial certified by the trial judge. 
Without either of these documents, the writ can only be prosecuted on the basis of the record kept by 
the clerk, which is limited to the indictment, arraignment, plea, verdict and sentence. See id. at 13 & 
n.2. 
 241.  Id. at 18. 
 242.  Id. at 20. 
 243.  See id. at 21-24 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 244.  Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963). 
 245.  See Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605 (2005). 
 246.  See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985). 
 247.  Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 675 (1958). 
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to counsel does not, however, apply outside of a first appeal: there is no 
right to legal representation for further appeals,248 petitions for certiorari,249 
or collateral attacks.250 
Appeals, like trials, are conceived of as fundamentally adversarial: 
 
In bringing an appeal as of right from his conviction, a criminal 
defendant is attempting to demonstrate that the conviction, with its 
consequent drastic loss of liberty, is unlawful. To prosecute the appeal, a 
criminal appellant must face an adversary proceeding that—like a trial—
is governed by intricate rules that to a layperson would be hopelessly 
forbidding.251 
 
Moreover, because they are adversarial, appeals provide “the 
opportunity to prove a conviction wrong.”252 This opportunity need only be 
“fair,” however, and “fairness does not require either counsel or a full 
appeal once it is properly determined that an appeal is frivolous.”253 
Moreover, a defendant will have been afforded adequate and effective 
review “so long as [the process] reasonably ensures that an . . . appeal will 
be resolved in a way that is related to the merit of that appeal.”254 
G. The Right to Appeal in Canada 
Like the United States Constitution, the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms does not explicitly guarantee a right to appeal. Although the 
Supreme Court has never directly addressed whether the right is implicit in 
section 7 of the Charter, it has described rights of appeal as “exceptional”255 
and “solely creatures of statute.”256 At this point, therefore, the right to 
appeal is not constitutionally guaranteed.257 
 
 248.  Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974). 
 249.  Id. at 617. 
 250.  Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556 (1987). 
 251.  Evitts, 469 U.S. at 387, 396. 
 252.  Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 24 (1956). 
 253.  Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 278 (2000). 
 254.  Id. at 276-77. 
 255.  Welch v. The King, [1950] S.C.R. 412, 428 (Can.). 
 256.  Kourtessis v. Minister of Nat’l Revenue, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 53, 69 (Can.). See also R. v. Smith, 
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 385, para. 21 (Can.). 
 257.  The lower courts that have addressed this question directly have held that § 7 does not require 
a right of appellate review. R. v. Robinson (1989) 63 D.L.R.4th 289 (Can.) (holding that an accused 
person has never enjoyed an unqualified right to appeal against conviction); Huynh v. Canada (1996) 
134 D.L.R.4th 612 (Can.) (holding in the immigration context that a right of appeal was not a 
requirement of fundamental justice). 
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Statutory rights to appeal against conviction and sentence are, 
however, commonplace.258 A person convicted on indictment may appeal 
against his or her conviction on a question of law or, with leave, on a 
question of fact, a mixed question of law and fact, or any other ground.259 
In practice, however, all grounds of appeal are considered on their 
merits.260 
Canadian appellate courts have only given limited consideration to the 
scope of appeals. In R. v. Sheppard, the Supreme Court held that “[w]here a 
party has a right of appeal, the law presupposes that the exercise of that 
right is to be meaningful.”261 Thus, where a trial is by a judge alone, the 
verdict must be accompanied by sufficiently detailed written reasons, so as 
to “preserve and enhance meaningful appellate review of the correctness of 
the decision . . . .”262 Similarly, a meaningful right of appeal also may 
demand the assistance of counsel.263 
It is clear that the onus is on appellants to exercise their rights of 
appeal. Courts may dismiss on procedural grounds appeals that are not 
pursued.264 
V. POTENTIAL REASONS FOR CONVERGENCE IN THE RIGHT TO 
APPEAL 
The above survey reveals considerable agreement, across a wide range 
of jurisdictions, on the essential features of the right to appeal. These 
features, and the degree of convergence, are examined in Part VII. 
This Part identifies a number of possible, and overlapping, reasons for 
convergence. Although there have been changes in the criminal procedures 
of both common law and continental systems, the most dramatic 
developments have been in the common law world. In postulating possible 
reasons for convergence, it is therefore sensible to focus primarily on the 
factors influencing common law systems. 
Understanding modern convergence is best done against an historical 
backdrop. History also has explanatory power, illuminating institutional 
forces driving the development of the right to appeal. This article has 
shown that the right to appeal developed much earlier in continental 
 
 258.  Kourtessis v. Minister of National Revenue, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 53, 69-70 (Can.). 
 259.  Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 675 (Can.). 
 260.  R. v. Bernardo, [1997] 121 C.C.C. 3d 123, para. 17 (Can. Ont. C.A.). 
 261.  R. v. Sheppard, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869, para. 66 (Can.). 
 262.  Id. para. 25. 
 263.  Bernardo, 121 C.C.C. 3d para. 21. 
 264.  R. v. Clarke, 31 A.R. 147, 44 (1981); R. v. Sopko, [1994] 5 W.W.R. 117 (Can. Man. C.A.); 
R. v. Peck, 129 Man. R. 2d 111 (1998). 
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European systems than in their common law counterparts. More 
importantly, however, entirely distinct factors fueled the emergence of the 
right in these two systems. In continental Europe, appellate review was an 
important instrumentality for the centralization of political power and 
control. Continental criminal justice systems hence remain characterized by 
hierarchical distribution of authority, with criminal appeals facilitating the 
effective exercise of that authority through close supervision of lower 
courts.265 In contrast, common law systems, with their emphasis on the 
dispersal of authority to the local level, rejected appellate oversight in 
criminal cases for hundreds of years. When a right of appeal was finally 
granted, it was driven by concerns over the factual correctness of particular 
verdicts rather than an institutional desire for central control and 
uniformity. There were, however, institutional concerns in play, 
particularly a desire to safeguard the legitimacy of the criminal justice 
system as a whole. 
Technological advancements also probably facilitated convergence. A 
prerequisite to meaningful appellate review is a record of the trial. This 
requirement was easily satisfied in continental systems, given the centrality 
of the dossier as a complete written record of the investigation and the role 
of the trial as a verification of its contents.266 By contrast, the common 
law’s aversion to written evidence in favor of oral testimony meant that to 
the extent a written trial record existed, it was very limited and unhelpful. 
This proved to be a significant obstacle to appellate review in criminal 
cases.267 In the absence of adequate technology, a written record of the 
evidence presented at trial could not easily be kept. The commercial 
production of typewriters and stenotypes,268 as well as the development of 
modern stenographic systems,269 were thus significant advances, which 
 
 265.  For a comparison of the importance of hierarchical supervision, primarily in the context of 
civil appeals, see Sofie M.F. Geeroms, Comparative Law and Legal Translation: Why the Terms 
Cassation, Revision and Appeal Should Not Be Translated . . ., 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 201 (2002). 
 266.  See Nico Jörg, Steward Field & Chrisje Brants, Are Inquisitorial and Adversarial Systems 
Converging?, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 41, 50 (Phil Fennell et al. eds., 
1995). 
 267.  PATTENDEN, supra note 4, at 19 (noting that the “absence of an accurate record of most trials” 
was an obstacle to the development of a criminal appeal); GREGORY J. DOWNEY, CLOSED CAPTIONING 
5 (2008) (“[I]n the courtroom, a transcription of every word that was uttered by judge, witness, and 
counsel was crucial to ensure the legal right of appeal.”). 
 268.  Elyce J. Rotella, The Transformation of the American Office: Changes in Employment and 
Technology, 41 J. OF ECON. HIST. 51, 53-54 (1981) (noting that typewriters were first produced in 
quantity in 1874, and that the next twenty years saw a “wave of invention of new office machines,” 
including the stenotype). 
 269.  DOWNEY, supra note 2667, at 106. (2008) (outlining the rise of stenography during the 
nineteenth century, with one hundred systems being published between 1880 and 1890, including the 
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broadly coincided with the emergence of criminal appeals in common law 
systems.270 
In the second half of the twentieth century, we find a third factor 
tending to produce convergence in criminal appeals: the adoption of human 
rights instruments. The right to have one’s conviction and sentence 
reviewed by a higher tribunal was first identified as a fundamental human 
right in article 14(5) of the ICCPR, adopted by the General Assembly on 16 
December 1966. Similar guarantees were later included in other 
multilateral rights instruments, including the American Convention on 
Human Rights271 and Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention. 
Conceiving of the right to appeal as a human right promoted 
convergence in three ways. First, the right’s presence in the ICCPR 
influenced its later inclusion in the domestic rights instruments of a number 
of common law systems, including South Africa, New Zealand, and 
Australian jurisdictions.272 The presence of this right has, as we have seen, 
significantly affected the nature of appeals in those countries. Leave to 
appeal restrictions were abolished, for example, in direct response to 
section 25(f) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.273 This may be 
contrasted with the very limited recognition given to the right to appeal in 
Canada, which has not recognized the right as fundamental. Second, the 
right’s presence in the European Convention has meant its adoption by 
almost every member of the Council of Europe, under the centralized 
oversight of the European Court. Finally, conceptualizing appellate review 
 
Gregg system in 1888, which remains widely taught in the United States); LESTER BERNHARDT 
ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA 80 (1939). Section 16 of the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, 7 
Edw. 7, c. 23 (Eng.) required shorthand notes of every trial to be taken and a transcript of them made 
available on appeal, if directed by the Registrar. Although provision of a transcript was construed as 
merely directory, the trial judge’s notes and a report on the trial were available on appeal. Id. at 29-30. 
 270.  Richard N. Current, The Original Typewriter Enterprise 1867-1873, 32 WIS. MAGAZINE OF 
HISTORY 391, 405 (observing that the early demand for typewriters came from court reporters). See also 
History of Court Reporting, NCRAONLINE.ORG, http://ncraonline.org/NCRA/pressroom/History/ 
History+of+Court+Reporting/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2011) (discussing the development of shorthand 
systems and linking the “explosion of technological advancements in the field of court reporting” 
during the late nineteenth century to an explosion in numbers of court reporters). 
 271.  American Convention on Human Rights, art. 8(2)(h), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 
(“Every person accused of a criminal offense has the right to be presumed innocent so long as his guilt 
has not been proven according to law. During the proceedings, every person is entitled, with full 
equality, to the following minimum guarantees: . . .  (h) the right to appeal the judgment to a higher 
court.”). 
 272.  Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic.) s 25(4) (Austl.); Human Rights 
Act 2004 (Austl. Cap. Terr.) § 22(4) (Austl.). 
 273.  Note that this statute is described in its long title as “An Act . . . to affirm New Zealand’s 
commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990. 
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as a human right has focused understanding of the right in terms of its 
utility to individuals. This individualized focus has installed the prevention 
of miscarriages of justice (i.e. error correction) as the principal objective of 
virtually every system of appellate review. Identifying a single, overarching 
rationale for criminal appeals is an effective means of converging on a 
common understanding of the right’s substance, which, in turn, is likely to 
flow through to appellate standards and procedures. 
A fourth and final factor that may have influenced convergence is the 
shift in a number of continental countries towards a greater emphasis on the 
trial phase of criminal proceedings and, in particular, on oral evidence:274 
“In many [European] countries restrictions on secondary evidence are 
rapidly increasing. Greater importance is being placed on oral evidence and 
confrontation between witnesses and the accused at the trial, while less 
reliance is placed on written forms of proof.”275 
This shift in favor of the principles of orality and immediacy in trial 
proceedings can be traced to the nineteenth century, with the French Code 
d’instruction criminelle in 1808 and the first German federal Code of 
Criminal Procedure of 1877.276 Unlike the other factors postulated, this 
change has driven convergence from the continental side of the equation. 
An increasing emphasis on oral evidence may tend to narrow the scope of 
review permitted on appeal. For example, following Italy’s adversarial 
reforms in 1988, while appeals on both law and fact remained possible, 
complete de novo review was not required, with the parties given the 
ability to narrow the scope of an appeal.277 The influence of this factor is, 
of course, considerably mitigated by the retention of reasoned, written 
judgments, which facilitate more extensive appellate oversight. 
None of the factors postulated in this Part provides, on its own, a 
sufficient explanation for the convergence of the common law and 
continental conceptions of criminal appeals. Each factor is worthy of 
further study. When taken together, however, it appears that considerable 
pressure was exerted—and will continue to be exerted—in favor of an 
 
 274.  B.S. Markesinis, Learning from Europe and Learning in Europe, in THE GRADUAL 
CONVERGENCE: FOREIGN IDEAS, FOREIGN INFLUENCES, AND ENGLISH LAW ON THE EVE OF THE 21ST 
CENTURY 1, 30 (B.S. Markesinis ed., 1994) (noting that “there is a slow convergence in procedural 
matters as the oral and written types of trials borrow from each other and are slowly moving to occupy a 
middle position”). 
 275.  Gordon Van Kessel, European Trends towards Adversary Styles in Criminal Procedure and 
Evidence, in THE JAPANESE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN CONTEXT: CONTROVERSIES AND COMPARISONS 
225, 229 (Malcolm M. Feeley & Setsuo Miyazawa eds., 2002). 
 276.  Stewart Field, Fair Trials and Procedural Tradition in Europe, 29 O.J.L.S. 365, 378 (2009). 
 277.  Freccero, supra note 163, at 380. 
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emerging common understanding of both the importance of the right to 
appeal as well as its essential features. 
VI. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE RIGHT TO APPEAL 
This Part synthesizes, in doctrinal terms, the convergence in 
contemporary formulations of the substance of the right to appeal. It argues 
that the right is best understood as requiring provision of an opportunity to 
access a fair appellate process that permits adequate review of conviction 
and sentence. The Part considers the common features of the right that 
emerge from the jurisdictions surveyed, as well as the differences that 
remain between the continental approach and that of common law 
jurisdictions. 
A. Appeals Must Be Adequate and Effective 
The most significant area of agreement within the jurisdictions 
covered is with respect to the substance of appeals: they must be both 
adequate and effective. These requirements of adequacy and effectiveness 
are distinct, and are discussed in turn. 
An appeal is only adequate where it allows for review of both the 
factual and legal basis of conviction. Under the ICCPR, the substance of 
convictions must be reviewable, including an assessment of the sufficiency 
of the evidence presented.278 In South Africa, there must be an “adequate 
reappraisal” that is suited to correcting errors and thus minimizing the risk 
of wrongful convictions.279 Similarly, in New Zealand,280 Canada,281 and 
the United States,282 it is clear that appellate review is intended to extend to 
questions of both law and fact. 
 
 278.  General Comment 32, supra note 123, para. 48; Aboushanif v Norway, UNHRC, Decision of 
July 17, 2008, Commc’n No. 1542/2007, para. 7.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/93/D/1542/2007; Bandajevsky 
v Belarus, UNHRC, Decision of Mar. 28, 2006, Commc’n No. 1100/2002, para. 10.13, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/86/D/1100/2002. 
 279.  S. v. Shinga 2007 (2) SACR (CC) 28 para. 40 (S. Afr.); S. v. Steyn 2001 (1) SA 1146 (CC) 
para. 23 (S. Afr.); S. v. Twala 2000 (1) SA 879 (CC) para. 9 (S. Afr.). 
 280.  Crimes Act 1961, § 385(1) (N.Z.) (providing that a court must allow an appeal against 
conviction if it is of the opinion that the verdict is unreasonable or there was a wrong decision on any 
question of law that justifies setting aside the conviction); R v Owen, [2008] 2 NZLR 37 (SC) 42 
(observing that the criterion of unreasonableness incorporates “a limited right of appeal on fact”). 
 281.  R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869, para. 25 (Can.) (noting that meaningful 
appellate review involves the opportunity to challenge the “correctness” of the verdict in both law and 
fact); R. v. Bernado (1997), 121 C.C.C. 3d 123, para. 17 n.1 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (noting that, even though 
appeals on questions of fact are technically with leave, all grounds of appeal are, in practice, considered 
on their merits). 
 282.  Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 24 (1956) (noting that an appeal provides “the opportunity to 
prove a conviction wrong”). 
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Almost paradoxically, the European Convention is something of an 
outlier with respect to the necessary scope of appellate review. It does not 
require that appeals extend to the evidential basis for conviction. The 
explanatory report to Protocol No. 7 noted that the right to an appeal was 
not inconsistent with restricting appeals to questions of law. Trechsel 
suggests that this caveat was made necessary by the variety of types of 
appeal that were available in Europe.283 Three other factors may also have 
been significant. First, continental appeals were historically more likely to 
extend to a complete reconsideration of the factual and legal basis for 
conviction. It may be presumed that nations who carved out exceptions to 
this general practice did so deliberately and for reasons that were entitled to 
respect. Second, even where de novo review is not possible and appeals are 
technically restricted to questions of law, the fact that trial court judgments 
are accompanied by detailed written reasons leaves considerable scope for 
a review of the factual basis for conviction.284 Thus, Spanish cassation 
proceedings, which are technically restricted to questions of law, regularly 
allow challenges to the factual basis for conviction. Third, appellate review 
in Europe retains its historical association with a hierarchical model of 
control rather than with a concern to prevent miscarriages of justice from 
occurring. Thus the European Court’s reluctance to set substantive 
requirements on appellate review may represent deference towards the 
ways in which states have arranged their judicial hierarchies.285 
Nevertheless, when the scope of appeals in modern common and civil 
law jurisdictions is compared against their respective histories, 
considerable convergence is apparent. The greatest movement has been in 
common law systems.286 Over the past century, the scope of appellate 
oversight has increased significantly, especially with respect to the factual 
basis for convictions. During the eighteenth century, the only possibility of 
review was for errors of law that either appeared on the record or were 
specifically reserved by the trial judge. Today, appellants have a vastly 
expanded arsenal of potential grounds for appeal, extending to the 
reasonableness of the verdict and many more identifiable errors of law.287 If 
 
 283.  TRECHSEL, supra note 7, at 365-66. 
 284.  See, e.g., LANGBEIN, supra note 154, at 83-84 (discussing appeals in German courts). 
 285.  It should also be noted that to the extent members of the Council of Europe have also ratified 
the ICCPR, the jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Committee puts pressure on this 
aspect of the European Court’s jurisprudence. 
 286.  See supra Part II.A. 
 287.  See supra Parts IV.D-G. 
MARSHALL 11_17_11 FINAL 2(DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2011  7:11 PM 
2011] A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT TO APPEAL 41 
civil law jurisdictions have moved, it is in the opposite direction. De novo 
review, while common, is not an unwavering requirement. 288 
Appeal must also be effective. Many of the jurisdictions surveyed have 
identified certain necessary prerequisites to achieving meaningful appellate 
review. The concern is to ensure that appellants have the practical means to 
challenge their convictions. 
Perhaps the most significant prerequisite is that certain documents 
must be available to putative appellants. This is a matter of logic. In order 
to pursue an appeal, particularly one concerned with demonstrating error at 
first instance, it is imperative to have access to a record of those 
proceedings. Thus a number of jurisdictions have emphasized the 
fundamental role that trial transcripts play.289 The reasons for the trial 
court’s verdict, where available, should also be provided.290 This 
requirement is of particular significance to common law appeals, where 
review does not proceed de novo. By contrast, review in Europe generally 
focuses less on the trial proceedings; and, even where the review is more in 
the nature of a common law appeal, the centrality of the written dossier and 
reasoned judgments means that providing appellants with access to the 
necessary documents is not burdensome.291 
Finally, it should be noted that the assistance of counsel will often be 
necessary in order to ensure that a defendant has effective access to appeal 
proceedings.292 The particular scope of this requirement more closely aligns 
with the right to legal assistance in criminal proceedings generally, on 
which there is considerable jurisdictional variation. 
 
 288.  See supra Parts IV.B-C. 
 289.  E.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19-20 (1956); R v Taito [2002] 3 NZLR 577 (P.C.) 600; 
S. v. Shinga 2007 (2) SACR 28 (CC) para. 37 (S. Afr.) (holding that “the absence of a [trial] record does 
not provide an opportunity for adequate reappraisal”); S. v. Steyn 2001 (1) SA 1146 (CC) para. 23 (S. 
Afr.); General Comment 32, supra note 123, para. 49. 
 290.  R. v. Sheppard, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869 (Can.). 
 291.  See Damaska, supra note 77, at 507 (observing that the written dossier is the “backbone of 
criminal proceedings”). 
 292.  See, e.g., R. v. Bernardo, [1997], 121 C.C.C. 3d 123 (Can. Ont. C.A.); S. v. Shinga 2007 (2) 
SACR 28 (CC) para. 58 (S. Afr.); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-56 (1963); Shulepov v. 
Russia, App. No. 15435/03, Section V, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: HUDOC, paras. 34-39 
(June 26, 2008), http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (click “HUDOC Database,” then select “HUDOC 
Collection” in “ECHR Document Collections” on left) (applying article 6(3)(c) of the European 
Convention to appellate proceedings); Lumley v Jamaica, UNHRC, Decision of Mar. 31, 1999, 
Commc’n No. 662/1995, para. 7.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/65/D/662/1995 (holding that counsel must be 
provided where appellant has been sentenced to death). 
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B. The Right to Appeal Is an Opportunity Right 
A ubiquitous feature of the right to appeal is that it is conceived of as 
an opportunity right. Conceptually, opportunity rights fall between negative 
human rights, which impose limitations on state action, and positive rights, 
which, when asserted, require positive state action, often the provision of 
goods or resources.293 Opportunity rights, in contrast, are concerned with 
the establishment of institutions and procedures—for example, jury trials, 
confrontation procedures294 and elections295—that individuals are entitled 
to access and in which they may participate.296 From the citizen’s 
perspective, an opportunity right is not primarily a right to be free from 
state action or to receive a benefit; it is a right that lies dormant until the 
citizen chooses to exercise it at the designated time. 
As an opportunity right, there is no obligation on states to ensure that 
convictions are always reviewed by higher courts. The obligation is to 
establish an appellate system, governed by fair procedures, that defendants 
have the opportunity to access. It is the individual’s responsibility to 
exercise the right, in accordance with the rules governing the institution. 
Indeed, the European Court has held that a crucial component of the right is 
that it must be exercisable on the defendant’s, rather than a third party’s, 
initiative.297 
Conceiving of the right to appeal as an opportunity right is of most 
significance when one considers the way in which appeal proceedings are 
conducted. It is essential that courts permit the appellant to participate 
actively in the proceedings. A procedure in which the appellant has no 
 
 293.  MANFRED NOWAK, INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME 23-24, 
48 (2003). 
 294.  See, e.g., United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559 (1988) (holding that the Confrontation 
Clause guarantees provision of an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, not the right to a “cross-
examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish” (quoting 
Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739 (1987))); Kostovski v. Netherlands, App. No. 11454/85, Court 
(Plenary), EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: HUDOC, para. 41 (Nov. 20, 1989), 
http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (holding that article 6(3)(d) of the European Convention requires “that 
an accused should be given an adequate and proper opportunity to challenge and question a witness 
against him”). 
 295.  The holding of elections is one of the primary obligations imposed on the state by the right to 
vote. 
 296.  Categorizing rights is, like categorizing legal systems, not an exact science. States 
undoubtedly have the obligation to respect, fulfill and protect all human rights; rights generally impose 
positive, negative and institutional obligations on states. NOWAK, supra note 293, at 48-51. 
Nevertheless, the primary feature of opportunity rights—the provision of a right to access an institution 
or procedure—is sufficiently distinct from other types of rights. 
 297.  Gurepka v. Ukraine, App. No. 61406/00, Section II, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
HUDOC, paras. 59-60 (Sept. 6, 2005), http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. 
MARSHALL 11_17_11 FINAL 2(DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2011  7:11 PM 
2011] A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT TO APPEAL 43 
opportunity to identify the issues or present submissions will be 
defective.298 
This requirement also cuts the other way. It is primarily for the 
appellant to demonstrate why a conviction should not have been imposed. 
A state is under no obligation to ensure the appellant makes the best 
possible use of this opportunity. Having provided access to appellate 
review of sufficient scope, the role of the court is to assess the merits of the 
appellant’s factual and legal complaints. 
C. The Appellate Process Must Be Fair 
The final feature of the right to appeal is that the appellate process 
must itself be fair. A fair process is difficult to define exhaustively. At a 
minimum, the procedure must be clear and accessible.299 Fairness may be 
considered further at three different levels. 
First, the process must be fair to the individual appellant. Procedural 
requirements must pursue legitimate aims, and they cannot be so onerous 
that, by restricting access, they impair the “very essence of the right.”300 
This is a fact-specific inquiry. However, it appears clear that demanding 
onerous filing fees would impair the exercise of the appeal right. On the 
other hand, time limits for bringing an appeal “undoubtedly serve the 
purpose of assuring a proper administration of justice.”301 Provided the 
limit itself does not prevent a diligent appellant from lodging an appeal,302 
it may be strictly enforced.303 
Second, the process must be fair as between groups of appellants. The 
process cannot discriminate between different classes of people. Cases 
from the United States, New Zealand, and South Africa make it clear that it 
 
 298.  Id. para. 61. 
 299.  Galstyan v. Armenia, App. No. 26986/03, Section III, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
HUDOC , para. 126 (Nov. 15, 2007), http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (finding a review system that 
“lack[ed] any clearly defined procedure or time limits and consistent application in practice” to breach 
article 2 of Protocol No. 7). 
 300.  Poulsen v. Denmark, App. No. 32092/96, Section II, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
HUDOC, at 5 (June 29, 2000), http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. 
 301.  Laaksonen v. Finland, App. No. 36321/97, Section IV, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS: HUDOC, at 3 (Sept. 7, 1999), http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc. 
 302.  Cavanilles v. Spain, No.116/1997/900/1112, Court (Chamber), EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS: HUDOC, para. 45 (Oct. 28, 1998), http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (holding that a three-day 
time limit for bringing a civil appeal was, in the circumstances, unreasonable and violated article 6(1)). 
 303.  Laaksonen, App. No. 36321/97, para. 1 (holding that the state was entitled to reject a notice of 
appeal received one day after the expiry of a thirty-day time limit for filing appeals). 
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is not permissible to impose more onerous conditions on appellants who are 
indigent or unrepresented.304 
Third, one should consider the fairness of the process at the systemic 
level. Because appellate resources are always limited, it is legitimate for a 
process to seek to channel its resources into hearing arguable or meritorious 
appeals; frivolous or hopeless appeals may be disposed of expeditiously, 
provided they still receive adequate consideration of their merits.305 Indeed, 
it is not in the interests of justice and fairness to allow unmeritorious 
appeals to prejudice the speedy resolution of those that have sufficient 
substance to justify a hearing.306 Undoubtedly, a system that does not deal 
with appeals quickly is unfair to individual appellants, who may be 
imprisoned for substantial periods without the opportunity to challenge 
their convictions.307 But it is also unfair for another reason: if an appeal is 
allowed, appellate delay risks prejudicing the fairness of any retrial that is 
ordered. Evidence may have degraded, and witnesses may be unavailable 
or their memories may have dimmed.308 
D. The Modalities of Appeal 
The most obvious differences between the European and common law 
jurisdictions discussed are with respect to the modalities of appeal. In 
general, appeals in Europe are heard de novo; evidence presented at the 
trial may be reassessed, and often supplemented, at second instance.309 By 
contrast, appeals in common law jurisdictions are based on the trial record, 
with more deference given to the first-instance fact-finder.310 
We have seen that these differences in the modalities of review have 
historical roots that go very deep, back to the European adoption, and 
English rejection, of Roman-canon procedure.311 The extent to which these 
differences persist today should not, however, be overstated. In 
contemporary France, Germany, and Italy, appeals not uncommonly fall 
 
 304.  Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); R v Taito [2002] 3 NZLR 577 (P.C.); S. v. Ntuli 1996 
(1) SA 1207 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 305.  Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 278 (2000); S. v. Ntuli 1996 (1) SA 1207 (CC) para. 24 (S. 
Afr.). 
 306.  S. v. Shinga 2007 (2) SACR 28 (CC) para. 51 (S. Afr.). 
 307.  In a number of communications, particularly from Caribbean nations, the Committee has 
found article 14(5) to have been violated due to significant delays between trial and the resolution of an 
appeal. See supra note 124. 
 308.  R. v. Sopko, [1994] 5 W.W.R. 117, para. 10 (Can. Man. C.A.). 
 309.  See supra Parts II.C, III, IV.B. 
 310.  See supra Parts II.A, III. 
 311.  See supra Part II.C. 
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short of full de novo review.312 Further, European jurisprudence is 
remarkably tolerant of appeals that are limited in scope, for example, to 
questions of law.313 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Appeals have become an increasingly important feature of common 
law criminal justice systems. Despite this trend, judicial and academic 
consideration of the right to appeal remains sparse. This article lays a 
foundation for further analysis of the right. 
A survey of the modern jurisprudence, considered against the 
backdrop of history and wider institutional features, reveals considerable 
convergence in the understanding and practice of appeals. Common law 
jurisdictions, in particular, have shifted considerably over the past century. 
Appeals, unknown for many hundreds of years, are now an integral part of 
virtually every common law criminal justice system. What was once a 
chasm between the common law and continental European approach to 
appeals has narrowed considerably. This article has identified a number of 
potential explanations for this convergence, including historical events, 
technological changes, the emergence of the right to appeal as a human 
right, and the increasing emphasis on orality in continental criminal 
procedure. Each one of these factors could be explored in greater detail, 
and further factors may have been salient. 
This paper has also synthesized the key features of the right to appeal 
in modern jurisprudence. Rights to appeal, it has argued, should be 
understood as opportunity rights: the state is required to provide those 
convicted of crimes with the opportunity to access a fair appellate process. 
While the exact form that an appeal takes may vary, all appeals must afford 
a convicted person the ability to access an adequate and effective review of 
conviction and sentence. Beyond these minimum requirements, the right to 
appeal does not mandate a particular standard of review. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 312.  See supra Part IV.B. 
 313.  See supra Part IV.C. 
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